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1 Introduction 
 
South Africa occupies an interesting position in the international development debate. On the 
one hand, as Africa’s most developed, diversified and, until recently, largest economy 
representing close to one-third of sub-Saharan Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP), it is 
an active player in numerous global governance and development fora, it maintains an 
extensive development partnership with the rest of Africa and is a member of the group of 
emerging countries, the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) Forum. Yet, on the 
other hand, it positions itself within the developing world, insisting that South Africa is itself a 
developing state despite its wealth relative to the rest of the continent and other developing 
countries. Indeed, South Africa’s middle-income status, ranking as the twenty-seventh 
largest economy in the world and with per capita income of US$7,508, masks ongoing 
significant inequality and poverty in its society. In part, it is the outcome of the legacy of 
apartheid despite 20 years of freedom, but also the result of massive and endemic 
unemployment, extremely weak health indicators (which have only begun improving recently) 
and persistently poor technical skills and educational results. With reference to the latter, this 
has been the case despite consistently high levels of expenditure on education over many 
years. South Africa has spent on average around 5 per cent of its GDP on education over the 
past 20 and preceding seven years, reaching an all-time high of 6.07 per cent of GDP in 
1993 (World Bank 2014). While South Africa has enjoyed the longest continuous economic 
upswing since 1999 (eNews Channel Africa 2013), with a brief interruption following the 2008 
financial crisis, its annual growth rate has been insufficient to create the number of jobs 
required to seriously address its high unemployment rate of 25 per cent.1 South Africa’s ‘job-
less’2 growth, despite numerous interventions to redress the past, is one of the biggest 
reasons for the perpetuation of severe societal inequality that mirrors racial divisions. This is 
evident in its high Gini coefficient of 0.70 in 2008 (Barrientos et al. 2013).3 
It is against this background that South Africa has been both a recipient and a ‘giver’ of aid. 
According to the National Treasury (2012), South Africa receives around ZAR8bn (US$1bn) 
a year of mainly European and United States (US) development assistance aimed primarily 
at the health and education sectors. This places South Africa among the top quintile of 
recipients of donor aid in Africa. While South Africa could not be described as donor-
dependent, given that official development assistance (ODA) represents less than 1 per cent 
of its annual budget, this aid has been important in helping the South African government to 
find innovative ways to deal with some of the key socioeconomic challenges that the country 
faces. Indeed, most government departments use ODA as seed funding to pilot government 
initiatives, experiment and innovate, but also to leverage domestic resources and improve 
service delivery. It is also worth recognising that South African civil society organisations 
(CSOs) are highly dependent on overseas project grants as an important contribution to their 
operating income. 
An important corollary to this narrative is that South Africa has also emerged as a key 
strategic partner for several Northern, but also Southern, partners. This is largely informed by 
its mineral wealth, but more importantly by the strategic position and role that it plays in the 
                                               
1 This represents the narrow or strict definition of unemployment, which represents only those people who take active steps to 
find employment but are unable to do so. According to the South African Reserve Bank, the expanded definition of 
unemployment translates into a 35 per cent unemployment rate and includes everyone who desires employment, irrespective of 
whether or not they actively try to obtain a position. 
2 While new jobs have been created in certain sectors of the economy, this has not been sufficient to mop up the vast number of 
unemployed. It is also important to note that there have been net job losses in the textile and leather industries and other low 
manufacturing sectors. 
3 The Gini coefficient for South Africa varies between 0.6 and 0.7, with the World Bank indicating that the Gini Index for South 
Africa was 63.4 in 2009 when it was last measured. 
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rest of Africa.4 This is apparent in its various political and economic engagements in the 
region and the pivotal role that it has historically played since 1994 as an economic hub and 
a gateway to the rest of Africa. While this position is increasingly being challenged by other 
emerging gateways to the rest of Africa such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Senegal, South 
Africa’s sophisticated banking system and well-developed and diversified economy and 
infrastructure provide it with a historic comparative advantage relative to its peers. 
A study conducted by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) in 2008 found 
that over half of South African government departments are involved in providing 
development assistance in one form or another to the region (Braude, Thandrayan and 
Sidiropoulos 2008). By 2004, it was estimated that a total of US$1.6bn of South African 
donor assistance had been provided to the rest of the region since the mid-1990s (Chin and 
Quadir 2012). But even these figures are under dispute, given that this process has been 
largely demand-driven and evolved incrementally without a central coordinating mechanism 
in place; hence, the current discourse and process underway in South Africa to establish a 
South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) to act as a central coordinating 
body through which South Africa’s various aid interventions would be channelled. 
During the course of this research, it became very clear that South Africa cannot be regarded 
as a ‘donor country’ or a ‘provider of development assistance’ in the mould of the definition of 
donors used by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-Development 
Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC). The OECD-DAC criteria of development aid sit 
uneasily with both the actual activities that South Africa undertakes in the region, and 
conceptually do not square with South Africa’s world view. Rather, South Africa’s 
development interventions in the region are framed within the broad interpretation of South-
South cooperation as articulated in the United Nations Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA) 
of 1978 and the High-level UN Conference on South-South Cooperation in Nairobi in 2009. 
As noted by Simplicio et al. (2013: 23) and by Besharati (2013a), South-South cooperation 
‘operates on the foundational principles of solidarity, non-interference and mutual benefit 
which comprise the sharing of knowledge and experiences, training, technology transfer, 
financial and monetary cooperation and in-kind contributions, among the developing nations’. 
This approach suggests an exchange of resources, technical expertise, peer learning and 
cooperation based on a common definition of partnership. It is thus no surprise that the 
South African government is wary of describing itself as a donor country and even the name 
of its ‘donor agency’ reflects this unease, having changed from the initially conceptualised 
South African International Development Agency (SAIDA) to SADPA, which emphasises 
partnership (Besharati 2013b). 
As will be noted below, a great number of South Africa’s ‘development interventions’ in its 
region fall under the broad rubric of peace-building, conflict mediation, post-conflict 
reconstruction and stabilisation of the region in partnership with mainly African actors and 
often under a UN and/or African Union (AU) mandate. These types of interventions are not 
regarded as aid contributions under the traditional DAC framework. Nonetheless, it is a 
prominent feature of South Africa’s support to the stability and development of Africa. 
South Africa is among the biggest African contributors to multilateral peacekeeping 
operations through the AU and the UN. It has been involved in peacekeeping operations in 
countries as diverse as Burundi, Central African Republic, Comores, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia and South Sudan. Importantly, apart from 
providing peacekeepers on the ground, South Africa has invested heavily in regional 
mediation and institution-building efforts in Africa. Of the former, its engagement in DRC has 
been the most extensive and ongoing. It has chosen continental initiatives and institutions 
                                               
4 South Africa is the only African country with which the European Union has established a strategic partnership, the EU-South 
African strategic partnership, while China has also entered into a strategic partnership with South Africa. 
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focused on the development and stabilisation of Africa as the key vehicles through which it 
has pursued its ‘development partnership agenda’ and the re-emergence or ‘renaissance’ of 
Africa. 
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2 South Africa’s historical role in 
international development cooperation 
 
South Africa’s regional approach and focus on peace-building, regional stabilisation and the 
preference for ‘African solutions for African problems’ (which is better formulated as ‘African 
ownership and partnership’) should be understood against the broader backdrop of South 
Africa’s historical destabilisation role in the region pre-1994. In this respect, South Africa 
views its engagement as servicing a ‘debt’ towards the region for its support for the liberation 
struggle in South Africa. It is also informed by a strong sentiment of enlightened self-interest, 
namely the realisation that South Africa cannot prosper in a region that is immersed in a ‘sea 
of poverty’. Numerous South African government statements also emphasise that peace, 
security and stability are absolute prerequisites for development. So how has South Africa’s 
approach towards development partnership with the region developed? 
Over the past 20 years, South Africa’s approach has shifted significantly from the initial 
position of broad rhetoric, as stated in the pre-1994 African National Congress (ANC) 
election manifesto. The former emphasised: rejoining the international community and 
playing a part in a ‘worldwide campaign for democracy, human rights, peace and nuclear 
disarmament’; working for ‘just economic and social relations between the developed 
industrial nations and the developing countries’; recognising that ‘our destiny is intertwined 
with that of Southern Africa’; and lastly, ‘build[ing] extensive links with countries of Africa and 
work[ing] with other states to ensure that the continent is not ignored by the rest of 
humankind’ (African National Congress 1994). 
By 2004, under the heading ‘Africa and the World’, the ANC election manifesto identified the 
following key objectives for the ANC-led government’s engagement globally (African National 
Congress 2004): 
● Work with others, speed up economic integration in Southern Africa and strengthen 
democracy, peace, stability as well as economic growth and development; and in 
particular, devote time and resources to assist in social normalisation and economic 
reconstruction in Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola and 
Swaziland. 
● Ensure realisation of the Constitutive Act of the African Union and implementation of 
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), including the setting up of 
the Pan African Parliament and other institutions and systems, as well as co-
operation with civil society, to promote development, prevent conflicts and ensure the 
rapid resolution of such conflicts when they occur. 
● Improve co-operation among countries of the South, in terms of economic relations, 
socio-political programmes and efforts to ensure peace and equitable global relations. 
● Strengthen economic and other relations with industrialised countries, including 
inward investment and tourism, trade and transfer of skills and technology. 
● Promote a collective multilateral approach to global challenges, and work for the 
democratisation of the United Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World 
Bank and other global institutions, and ensure that development and environmental 
goals of humanity are pursued and met. 
South Africa’s relations with the rest of Africa and Africa’s engagement with the rest of the 
world emerged as a central pillar of South Africa’s foreign policy. Today, it is framed as South 
Africa’s African Agenda in the strategic plan of the South African Department of International 
Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). (The name change of the department from the South 
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African Department of Foreign Affairs followed in 20095 after the ANC Polokwane conference 
in 2007 recommended the establishment of a dedicated South African agency to coordinate 
South Africa’s donor partnership activities.) 
The trajectory of South Africa’s development partnership agenda will be explored in further 
depth below. However, some initial principles guiding this agenda are apparent from the 
various ANC policy conference resolutions, government policy papers and various initiatives 
launched by the South African government over the past two decades. They are: 
● South Africa prioritises Africa in its development partnership agenda with a few small 
exceptions – this is a result of both enlightened self-interest (as noted before, a stable 
and prosperous region ensures a stable and prosperous South Africa) and a historical 
debt owed to the region for the support extended to the ANC during the apartheid 
years. In more recent years, a need has been identified by various stakeholders 
(including Parliament) for a more national interest-driven development partnership 
agenda, ensuring that South Africa’s peace and development interventions in the 
region also bring home economic and other benefits for South African society and 
that it responds to the threat of ‘rising competition’ in its own hinterland – mainly from 
other major emerging countries, but also regional competitors such as Nigeria, 
Angola and others. 
● Conflict resolution and mediation in the mould of the South African model has 
emerged as a key tool for South Africa to prepare the foundation for its development 
initiatives. Combined with the reform of African institutions to be more responsive to 
the needs of Africa’s citizens, South Africa is working hard to place the African 
continent on a more sustainable development path. 
● Regional approaches to development and the strengthening of regional institutions 
and initiatives (such as the AU, South African Development Community (SADC), 
NEPAD and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)) to play a constructive 
developmental and stabilising role have been prioritised and help to ensure African 
ownership in South Africa’s development partnership interventions. 
● While North-South collaboration is strongly supported by South Africa, and has 
proven crucial for the execution of a substantial part of South Africa’s development 
initiatives – mainly through the vehicle of trilateral cooperation – South-South 
cooperation is the primary feature of South Africa’s development cooperation agenda. 
● South Africa views the limits imposed by the reform of traditional global development 
institutions, along with the rise of key economies in the South, as a potential 
opportunity for the establishment of complementary or alternative institutions, policies 
and processes that can assist Africa’s development cause, also given the size of the 
‘development investment’ that is required in Africa – the discourse around the BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) development bank should be 
understood in this context. 
● South Africa’s international engagement efforts and ‘activism’ on behalf of Africa (in 
bodies such as the Group of Twenty (G20), and the Bretton Woods and UN 
institutions) are directed at rebalancing the current global framework to allow the 
creation of a more enabling environment for African development. This is about 
strengthening Africa’s voice in global discourses that are fundamental to Africa’s 
future development trajectory, stability and prosperity. 
● South Africa aligns itself with the global South in its world view, self-actualisation and 
mode of engagement. It is reluctant to describe its development interventions as 
‘donor aid’, or to describe itself as a donor. Instead, a discourse that prefers 
cooperation above assistance and partnership over a donor–recipient relationship 
                                               
5 This happened after President Jacob Zuma assumed the presidency. The name change was motivated by the need to reflect 
more closely the dual role that South Africa wanted to incorporate in its foreign affairs department. 
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features prominently in the South African debate. The term ‘development partner’6 is 
the preferred, but also the more appropriate, term to describe South Africa’s 
development activities. 
● South Africa is hesitant to engage in any endeavour that might constrain both its own 
and Africa’s policy space for development,7 hence the significant emphasis in its 
external outreach – also in the global development policy discourse – on partnership, 
ownership and common goals, but, importantly, differential responsibilities. South 
Africa has followed the aid effectiveness debate closely as an engaged observer, 
recognising that there are important lessons to be drawn from the experience of 
Northern donors. However, it is fundamentally interested in development 
effectiveness, and more importantly that there should be a much stronger emphasis 
on development partnership in the global context that levels the playing fields 
regarding opportunities available for trade and investment in developing countries. 
More trade and investment complemented by more aid should be utilised to enable 
Africa to participate fully in its own development. 
● SADPA provides an opportunity for South Africa to professionalise and systematise 
its approach. More importantly, SADPA also presents an opportunity to work more 
closely with civil society and other actors outside government on South Africa’s 
regional capacity-building and South-South cooperation efforts. South Africa’s 
epistemic community focusing on South Africa’s foreign relations (and in particular 
South Africa’s African Agenda) could play an important complementary role in 
supporting its partnership with the region. SADPA therefore offers a unique 
opportunity to leverage the total South African offering and capacity in this area – 
including civilian, private sector and state-driven capacities. 
● Yet, South Africa still faces deep and systemic internal development and poverty 
challenges, which both inhibit and determine its ability to act as a development 
partner towards the region; it also strongly informs the internal public discourse about 
South Africa’s development partnership agenda. However, it should be noted that 
South Africans are not completely adverse towards a donor partnership role for South 
Africa in its region, as borne out by the Ipsos Markinor foreign policy survey that was 
conducted on behalf of the University of Stellenbosch (Van der Westhuizen and 
Smith 2013). 
● Lastly, there is space for closer collaboration between the South African government 
and other South African actors, such as business, to improve the impact of South 
Africa’s various development partnership interventions in the region. The South 
African private sector is very active in the region, covering among others the retail, 
telecommunications, manufacturing, banking and mining sectors. For many years it 
was the most significant foreign investor in the region, but it is facing increasing 
competition from other market and non-market players. Its ability to play a supportive 
role in the South African government’s development partnership outreach is under-
utilised. Much still needs to be done to foster a closer public–private partnership in 
South Africa’s development partnership approach towards the region. 
The above formulation explores, to a certain extent, the potential and the limitations of South 
Africa’s current approach. While coherence is intimated in the above extrapolation, the reality 
on the ground is that the absence of a central coordinating development partnership agency 
alongside limited coordination, consultation and cooperation among government 
departments and other key stakeholders, such as the private and non-governmental sector, 
                                               
6 An alternative term to describe emerging ‘donor countries’, Southern Provider, stems from a meeting convened by the Indian 
Ministry of External Affairs and the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) in April 2013. 
7 This is broader than development of course. It is mainly in the economic policy space, where certain initiatives (for example at 
World Trade Organization (WTO) level) by Northern countries are perceived as potentially constraining South Africa’s policy 
space, such as the Singapore issues. The Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) debate is another one, as are the bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs), which South Africa perceives as protecting foreign companies and reducing the scope for ‘redress’ 
the government would like to have through Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and local content procurement. 
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pose a significant challenge to South Africa’s development partnership agenda and the 
efficacy of its interventions. 
2.1 Evolution of the country’s development partnership and 
cooperation agenda 
2.1.1 The South African Constitution: justiciable socioeconomic rights 
While an analysis of the discourse on development in South Africa and ODA to South Africa 
generally tends to include a document review of the key ANC policy documents in the form of 
manifestos, resolutions, government strategy documents and the White Paper on foreign 
policy, it is useful to start with the South African Constitution, and in particular, the 
enshrinement of the concept of ‘socioeconomic rights’ or social justice as a fundamental 
principle of post-apartheid society.8 Indeed, the Constitution embraces the concept that 
individuals are only fully able to participate in society if they are enabled to exercise their full 
and complete political, civil and socioeconomic rights (Heyns and Brand 1998: 157): 
The Preamble to the Constitution starts by recognising the injustices of the past, and 
then sets out national objectives, including the goal of establishing ‘a society based 
on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights’. Thereafter a 
wide range of socio-economic rights are recognised alongside civil and political rights 
as human rights in the Bill of Rights. The very structure of the Bill of Rights is 
designed to emphasise the fact that socio-economic rights in the South African Bill of 
Rights are part and parcel of the wider concept of human rights. Socio-economic 
rights are not listed separately under their own heading or even grouped together – 
they are interspersed between the other rights, on an equal level, emphasising the 
interdependence and indivisibility of the different generations of rights. 
This approach was adopted against the backdrop of the widespread discriminatory political 
and social policies of pre-1994 South Africa. While Heyns and Brand (1998) note that ‘the 
inclusion of socio-economic rights as justiciable rights in a national constitution is a relatively 
recent development and the scale on which this was done in the South African Constitution is 
certainly unique’, what is extraordinary is the lengths to which South Africa has gone to 
export these norms into the broader global setting – with specific reference to Africa’s 
historical place in the global community. This is situated in a sometimes emotive discourse of 
‘global apartheid’ where Africa, like the rest of the developing world, has frequently found 
itself marginalised and excluded. To borrow from Marco Vieira (2012), these themes have 
been translated in terms of Southern norms as the notion of ‘distributive justice’, where ‘the 
reorganisation of international governance structures [occurs] in a way that they would 
promote a more equitable distribution of wealth and political participation of the developing 
world’. South Africa has consistently worked towards a levelling of the global playing field to 
enable Africa to develop and prosper.9 
As noted by Charlotte McClain-Nhlapo (2005: 71), a Commissioner of the South African 
Human Rights Commission, during a UN dialogue in 2005 on achieving the internationally 
agreed development goals: 
In conclusion, if we are serious about meeting the first MDG [Millennium 
Development Goal], we must ensure good governance, the rule of law, solid 
                                               
8 See Bill of Rights, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, No 108 of 1996, 
www.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/a108-96.pdf. 
9 The importance of socioeconomic rights for South Africa in the global context has also been taken by South Africa to the UN 
Human Rights Council. Its frustration with Europe and the US is that they place far greater emphasis on the civil and political 
dimensions of human rights and not enough on the socioeconomic dimension. 
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democratic institutions… Furthermore, these components need to be complemented 
by a vibrant civil society… [and] the political will to act and provide sufficient 
resources. And where states are not able to meet these through their own resources, 
then they must request international assistance… The impressive commitments 
made by many African leaders to pursue economic and political reforms are 
heartening. Through NEPAD, they will continue the agenda for the continent’s 
renewal… Moreover, in order to ensure that Africa advances more towards reaching 
the MDGs we will have to have fairer access to trade, improved donor harmonization 
and coordination as well as deeper debt relief, and an increase in aid to sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
However, it is useful to briefly reflect on South Africa’s internal development discourse and 
institutions before considering further how South Africa has engaged internationally on 
development. 
2.1.2 South Africa’s internal development discourse and development 
frameworks 
Faced with severe societal poverty and inequality when the new ANC-led government took 
power, the government developed successive elaborate poverty reduction and development 
strategies. Each of these was accompanied by an extensive state architecture to support the 
roll-out of these strategies. The first of these was the adoption of the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP), which was underpinned by the establishment of the RDP 
Ministry under the leadership of Minister Jay Naidoo reporting directly to the president. 
However, the unwieldiness of the plan, its prohibitive cost against the backdrop of the empty 
state coffers that the new ANC-led government inherited and its perceived business-
unfriendliness led to the replacement of the programme with the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) strategy in 1996. 
GEAR focused mainly on restoring macroeconomic stability in South Africa while supporting 
employment creation, growth and poverty reduction through the rapid liberalisation of the 
South African trade and financial markets. The more leftist elements of the ANC support 
base (especially the trade unions) vehemently opposed GEAR, considering it a neoliberal, 
‘Washington Consensus’-type policy. While GEAR achieved some successes, by 2005 it was 
replaced by the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative (ASGISA), which focused on 
removing the binding constraints that were hampering economic growth and job creation – 
especially in the ‘second economy’. 
The latest iteration of South Africa’s internal development architecture focused on 
macroeconomic policy is the establishment of the Department of Economic Development. 
Furthermore, under President Zuma, the presidency has become even more central to South 
Africa’s national development framework with the establishment of two new bodies: the 
National Planning Commission, led by Minister Trevor Manuel (the former South African 
finance minister) and the Department for Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME), 
led by Minister Collins Chabane. The National Development Plan (NDP), a 2030 strategy 
with clear targets to eliminate poverty and support job creation, is the outcome of the 
National Planning Commission (National Planning Commission 2011). 
The Department of Economic Development developed the New Growth Path (NGP), a 
macroeconomic strategy that aims to create five million jobs through a social compact 
between business, the unions and government. A key pillar of the NGP is significant public 
investment in infrastructure of around 10 per cent of GDP per year. However, it is important 
to note that South Africa’s development planning processes are not always well coordinated, 
despite these elaborate overarching development frameworks. This is largely the result of a 
lack of coordination and a ‘silo-based’ approach between government departments. The 
presidency tries to overcome these hurdles through the adoption of an outcomes-based 
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approach focused on 12 national priorities stemming from the ANC election manifesto ― 
hence the importance of the DPME. But one of the biggest hurdles to the efficacy of the 
country’s ambitious job creation strategies is the lack of partnership between the South 
African private and government sectors. The significance of this lack of cooperation is also 
evident in South Africa’s development partnership initiatives in the region. 
The most significant failures of South Africa’s various development initiatives since 1994 are, 
arguably, its weak educational outcomes and insufficient employment creation. With an 
unemployment rate of 25 per cent, a critical side-narrative that has accompanied the 
development of an overarching internal development framework for South Africa has been 
the expansive roll-out of social grants since 1994 targeting the most poor and vulnerable in 
society (Patel 2005; Devereux 2011).10 Under the auspices of the Department of Social 
Welfare, 3.5 per cent of South Africa’s GDP is currently spent on social assistance 
programmes. This forms an interesting comparison with Brazil, whose social assistance 
programmes represent 2 per cent of its GDP (Barrientos et al. 2013). More worrying though, 
is the fact that the outcomes in South Africa of the expansion of the social welfare system are 
far less positive than those in Brazil related to both the level of inequality and the number of 
people who have escaped the poverty trap. 
Additional policy interventions by the South African government to achieve broader 
redistribution of wealth were the introduction of land restitution policies and Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) through the adoption of the BEE Act of 2003. The latter intends to 
engineer the transfer of 25 per cent of the country’s productive assets to previously 
disadvantaged communities while also transforming the South African labour market and 
wealth through the introduction of charters, score cards and quotas, and preferential access 
to government procurement. Some of the key criticisms of BEE, but also against increasing 
government intervention in the economy, are efficiency losses, policy uncertainty and, more 
critically, increasing corruption. While BEE has resulted in the establishment of a new black 
minority elite with close ties to the government, it still fundamentally excludes the most 
disadvantaged members of society. The government intends to address this gap through the 
implementation of the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act No 46 of 2013. 
2.1.3 Moving towards a ‘developmental state’ 
There have been growing incidences of stronger state intervention in the South African 
economy in an attempt to address the slow rate of growth and employment. This has been 
articulated as the need to reframe the South African state and society into a ‘developmental 
state’. A ‘developmental state’ traditionally refers to the Asian development model followed 
by countries such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and China – where a strong and capable 
state intervenes significantly in the economy through regulation, the protection of infant 
industries and support of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to grow local manufacturing and 
exports – essentially supporting export-led economic development and industrialisation. 
There is significant concern about whether South Africa is able to replicate this approach, 
especially as many of the main interventions in the Asian development model took place 
against a backdrop of authoritarianism and/or limited political rights. The ‘developmental 
state’ approach is considered as a way to advocate an even greater role for the state in the 
economy; however, the structure of the South African economy, the nature of South Africa’s 
political and social culture, the inefficiencies apparent in its various SOEs, as well as 
                                               
10 Devereux notes that Patel (2005, cited in Devereux 2011: 415) posits that the ‘developmental perspective to social welfare in 
South Africa is… rooted in a rights-based approach’ and that in this sense South Africa’s approach to social protection is 
exceptional in that there is a recognition that ‘social protection can be both a policy instrument for development and a vehicle for 
achieving political objectives – such as social justice for all’ (Devereux 2011: 415). Furthermore, the Taylor Committee of Inquiry 
into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa noted, in arriving at a definition of comprehensive social 
protection, ‘[that] it is broader than the traditional concept of social security’ incorporating ‘development strategies and 
programmes designed to ensure, collectively, at least a minimum acceptable living standard for all citizens’. 
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increasing service delivery failures at municipal and community level, raise questions about 
such an approach (Besharati 2013b; Ncube, Shimeles and Verdier-Chouchane 2012). 
This discourse about a ‘developmental state’ has been translated by authors such as 
Landsberg (2005: 723-4) into the foreign policy terrain, suggesting that South Africa’s 
external engagement should be interpreted as a ‘developmental foreign policy’. His article on 
South Africa’s ‘developmental foreign policy’ raises interesting perspectives on how South 
Africa needs to engage the external community on both its own and Africa’s development 
challenges. He essentially posits that ‘the broader African condition depicts much of the 
same characteristics of poverty and inequality as that of South Africa’. This implies that the 
South African foreign policy community ought ‘to engage the international community – 
[i.e.]…. the industrialized North and the developing South… in a way that deliberately tries to 
help address [South Africa’s] national condition, and the African condition’. 
In considering whether this approach to South Africa’s foreign policy is relevant, it is useful to 
look at how South Africa has addressed the African condition more broadly since 1994 – 
given that this has been a key terrain for its external engagement. 
2.1.4 South Africa and Africa’s development: the centrality of peace and 
stability 
As noted by Besharati (2013b) and Sidiropoulos (2012), one of the first undertakings by the 
South African government in 1994 was to forgive the debt owed to it by Namibia, Swaziland 
and Mozambique of around ZAR3bn. More importantly, the pre-1994 South African 
government’s decision to return the South African territorial enclave, the port of Walvis Bay, 
to the newly independent Namibia following pressure from the ANC, underwrote the new 
South African government’s intention to set post-1994 South Africa’s relationship with Africa 
on a completely new footing void of its hegemonic and colonialist past.11 This bold initiative 
has continued to set the tone for the way that South Africa engages with the rest of Africa. 
As Africa’s most sophisticated economy, South Africa looms politically and economically 
large in African affairs – both regionally and globally. South Africa has adopted a strategy 
that demonstrates decisive leadership in African initiatives, while at the same time taking 
care – unfortunately not always with success – not to be cast as a regional hegemon or bully 
only interested in advancing its own interests or dominating the rest of the region. South 
Africa’s quiet diplomacy towards its region has been supported by an elaborate regional 
strategy. This included contributing significantly to the development of a novel architecture 
that formulated new principles, guided continental processes and reformed existing 
institutions alongside the establishment of new bodies that set out the rules of engagement, 
processes and institutions of African transcontinental cooperation. However, South Africa’s 
first and primary priority was, and arguably continues to be, contributing towards peace in its 
own region. 
It was clear very early in the life of South Africa’s democratic dispensation and its various 
forays into the region that the South African government considered peace and stability as 
an absolute sine qua non for development in Africa, but also for its own development. Thus 
South Africa’s expansive efforts in regional peace-building over the past 20 years in Burundi, 
DRC, Sudan, Somalia and, less successfully in Côte d’Ivoire and Angola, and more 
controversially in Zimbabwe, are a lasting testament to this belief. 
Put simplistically, the South African government’s mode of engagement in conflict zones 
closely mirrors that of its own internal transition. This entails the preference for negotiation 
                                               
11 The Walvis Bay port facilities, Namibia’s only deep-water port, were jointly managed by a Joint Administrative Authority 
established by South Africa and Namibia after Namibian independence. South Africa transferred control over the port enclave to 
the Namibian authorities on 1 March 1994, shortly before South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994. 
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over military intervention as the preferred mode of engagement, an all-inclusive process 
(engaging all the contesting parties) and, lastly, an inclusive political settlement that 
essentially delivers a two-step transition: first, a ‘government of national unity’ arrived at 
either through political settlement or election, working together on the formulation of a new 
constitution, followed by a second election under the new constitution where hopefully a 
decisive, and not necessarily an inclusive, winner emerges. While these types of 
interventions do not fit the accepted definition of ODA precisely, it is the area where most 
South African government resources have been channelled over the past 20 years and it is 
the most prominent area where South Africa has established its credentials both regionally 
and globally as a country that invests in the stability and development of its region. 
In the early years post-1994, under the presidency of Nelson Mandela, a great deal of 
emphasis was placed on the reintegration of South Africa into the global community following 
over 30 years of increased isolation. South Africa became a key advocate of nuclear and 
weapon disarmament, resulting in the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) and the signing and adoption of the Ottawa Treaty on de-mining. In many respects, 
South Africa established itself during this period as an important bridge-builder, acting as a 
responsible middle power and utilising the moral authority of its peaceful transition to garner 
significant support for its foreign initiatives in the interest of global peace and development. 
2.1.5 Contributing towards African institutions and frameworks to 
stabilise the region: reaching out to the developed North 
However, it was under the presidency of Thabo Mbeki from 1999 onwards that the South 
African government’s engagements globally and in the rest of Africa elaborated far more 
explicitly its vision to play a constructive role in the development and stability of the continent. 
Its approach was comprehensive — straddling both bilateral and regional initiatives. The 
efforts of putting the entire continent on a more sustainable growth path were most clearly 
manifested in the role that South Africa played in engineering the reform of the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU), which led to the establishment of the African Union (AU) in Durban in 
2002. This was preceded by the adoption of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) in July 2001 by the African heads of state and government as ‘the AU’s socio-
economic development programme… designed to operationalise the vision and the 
principles of the [AU] Constitutive Act’ (Malcomson 2004: 11). 
The adoption of NEPAD signified a clear example of enlightened and decisive leadership and 
effective African coalition-building focused on placing Africa’s engagement with the North on 
a new footing. It was the outcome of close cooperation and trade-offs under the guidance of 
South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki, Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo, Senegal’s Abdoulaye Wade and 
Algeria’s Abdelaziz Bouteflika. But even more noteworthy within the context of this paper, 
NEPAD also signalled a redefinition of Africa’s historical donor–recipient engagement with its 
traditional donors to one that is much more strongly founded on the principle of joint 
partnership. This became very apparent in the North-South outreach initiatives that 
manifested themselves following the Kananaskis G8 Summit hosted by the Canadian 
government in 2002, which included for the first time a G8 outreach to Africa through the 
adoption of the African Action Plan. As noted in the G8 Africa Plan (2002: 1), the G8 leaders 
responded directly to the key points put forward by NEPAD: 
We, the Heads of State and Government of eight major industrialised democracies 
and the Representatives of the European Union, meeting with African Leaders at 
Kananaskis, welcome the initiative taken by African States in adopting the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), a bold and clear-sighted vision of 
Africa’s development. We accept the invitation from African Leaders, extended first at 
Genoa last July and reaffirmed in the NEPAD, to build a new partnership between the 
countries of Africa and our own, based on mutual responsibility and respect. The 
NEPAD provides an historic opportunity to overcome obstacles to development in 
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Africa. Our Africa Action Plan is the G8's initial response, designed to encourage the 
imaginative effort that underlies the NEPAD and to lay a solid foundation for future 
cooperation. 
This outreach to Africa was formalised at the G8 Evian Summit in June 2003 in France with 
the establishment of the Africa Partnership Forum (APF), which consists of the personal 
representatives of the heads of state or government of the members of NEPAD, other African 
institutions and Africa’s major multilateral and bilateral development partners.12 The Forum is 
an extension of the consultative process between the G8 and the NEPAD-initiating African 
heads of state. It initially met twice a year, but a decision was taken at the 21st meeting of 
APF in Senegal on 27 November 2013 to reduce the meetings to an annual meeting. South 
Africa, as a key African country representative and supporter of NEPAD, has been an active 
participant in all subsequent G8 outreach initiatives to Africa, at first purely ‘representing 
African interests’. 
This role subsequently expanded with an outreach invitation extended by Prime Minister 
Tony Blair to South Africa as part of the emerging group of countries, Brazil, China, India and 
Mexico – known as the Outreach 5 – to the Gleneagles Summit in 2005. Following the 2008 
financial crisis, the G20 (in which South Africa is the only African country represented) 
became the premier international forum for engagement on key global economic governance 
challenges. The first G20 Summit was hosted by President Bush on 14-15 November 2008 in 
Washington. 
2.1.6 South Africa’s contributions to African instruments and regional 
development institutions 
In setting new precedents on how African countries could become more stable, South Africa 
was also instrumental in setting up the voluntarily based African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM) under the auspices of NEPAD. The APRM enables ongoing review of the 
performance of member countries by peers through significant civil society participation in 
four core sectoral areas, namely: political; economic; socioeconomic; and corporate 
governance. The APRM is also partly the result of a tempering of South Africa’s human rights 
agenda in the rest of the region following the strident criticism that South Africa endured 
when President Mandela publicly called for sanctions against the Sani Abacha regime in 
Nigeria following the execution of the writer Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ongoni activists.13 
A key outcome that was posited in the founding document of the APRM is an Africa that is on 
a more sustainable, peaceful development and shared-growth path. More importantly, it 
emphasises the value of peer learning from appropriate and African best-practice examples 
(rather than the importing of ideas that are not appropriate to African conditions), thereby 
underwriting a key principle in South Africa’s foreign policy – namely of South-South 
cooperation, learning and partnership. Importantly, the launch of the AU and the introduction 
of the APRM signified for the first time a substantial move away from the hallowed and 
absolute principle in Africa of sovereignty as one of non-interference in the affairs of other 
nation states towards a more nuanced interpretation of non-indifference. 
It is worth noting that South Africa is the biggest contributor to NEPAD. It provides ZAR35m a 
year to this initiative. Two-thirds of its contribution is to the NEPAD Planning and 
Coordinating Agency (NPCA), while one-third goes towards supporting the APRM initiative. It 
also hosts the NPCA, providing premises, equipment and tax exemptions to the agency and 
its staff. South Africa has also in the past provided high-level secondments to the NEPAD 
agency, including the first chief executive officer (CEO), Professor Wiseman Nkhulu, a 
                                               
12 See www.africapartnershipforum.org/50086000.pdf. 
13 The writer and environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ongoni activists were executed for treason despite efforts by 
President Mandela to negotiate an amnesty for them during and following their military trial. 
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former economic adviser to President Thabo Mbeki. South Africa also provides active 
support to another body of the AU, the Pan-African Parliament, in a similar manner. 
Other regional commitments by South Africa towards African institution-building include its 
engagement within the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) framework. SACU is the 
oldest customs union in the world. Established in 1910 to compensate for South Africa’s 
economic dominance in the region, its members include (apart from South Africa) Botswana, 
Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland, the so-called BNLS states. South Africa contributes yearly 
around 98 per cent of SACU’s common revenue pool. Three of the members (Botswana is 
the exception) also share a currency union with South Africa. SACU is based on a revenue-
sharing agreement that disproportionally favours the four smaller members, with South Africa 
transferring the bulk of its customs duties to its neighbours. In the 2009/10 budget this 
represented more than 1 per cent of its GDP or US$3bn. While South Africa’s transfers are 
not recognised as development assistance, it is worth noting that the SACU transfers 
constitute 50–70 per cent of the revenue of countries like Swaziland and Lesotho and 15–30 
per cent of revenue in Namibia and Botswana. As noted by Vickers (2012), South Africa has 
recently requested a renegotiation of the SACU revenue-sharing formula to enable a more 
equitable distribution of revenues. Moreover, it proposed a shift from general revenue 
transfers to a regional development fund in support of regional infrastructure and industrial 
capacity. 
South Africa is also the biggest contributor to the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), providing 20 per cent of the 15-member regional institution’s operational budget. It 
is an active participant in SADC peace-building and regional integration efforts. A South 
African secondment currently occupies one of the Deputy Executive Secretary posts in 
Gaborone, the seat of the SADC secretariat. 
South Africa is also the biggest contributor to the AU budget, transferring ZAR150–200m a 
year to the AU, representing 15 per cent of the organisation’s budget. South Africa more 
recently, but also controversially, successfully fielded a candidate for the Chair of the AU 
Commission (AUC). Minister Nkosazana Zuma, the former minister of Home Affairs and 
Foreign Affairs and the first female representative in this role in the 50-year history of the 
OAU/AU, assumed this post in 2013. 
All of the above initiatives demonstrate the primacy of Africa in South Africa’s external 
engagement, but also the South African government’s strong belief in the principle of 
subsidiarity. This underpins its efforts to strengthen regional institutions and initiatives to deal 
with regional concerns. It has also informed its efforts to improve cooperation between the 
UN Security Council (UNSC) and the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) as noted 
further below. 
2.1.7 South Africa and the MDGs: common commitments, differential 
responsibilities and the need for reform of traditional development 
institutions 
Over the past 20 years, South Africa has worked with other like-minded countries on the 
adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as a key global priority to alleviate 
poverty, especially in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). It is actively engaging in the 
development of the post-2015 development agenda, having co-chaired the special event on 
achieving the MDGs at the 68th UN General Assembly (UNGA) meeting on 24 September 
2013. However, here it is important to note that South Africa positions its engagement in the 
post-2015 development agenda in the context of its own development aspirations, as well as 
those of the developing South, particularly Africa (Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation 2013b): 
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We also wish to emphasise that any development agenda beyond 2015 must be 
based on the principle of Common but Differential Responsibilities in order to 
equalise the international playing field. We raise this point out of concern because it 
appears that the global economic meltdown has brought about new developments 
that are detrimental to the developing world, especially Africa. Some of the new 
developments include the tendency to renegotiate the rules of the game... We wish to 
emphasise as well our expectations that the developed North and the developing 
South should continue to engage in a genuine partnership. 
President Zuma continued by observing that it is important that developed countries meet 
their commitment to the developing world to contribute 0.7 per cent of their gross national 
income (GNI) towards ODA. He furthermore noted that to delegate ‘some of these new 
historical responsibilities to new emerging economies in the South is unacceptable and 
unworkable as such emerging nations have their own historical challenges and backlogs to 
deal with’. 
It is against this background that South Africa’s active role in global aid effectiveness 
meetings in Paris, Accra and Busan, and serving on the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness 
hosted by the OECD, should be assessed. While not a member of the OECD, South Africa 
enjoys ‘observer’ status and has diplomats at its Paris mission assigned to monitor OECD-
DAC meetings of relevance and interest to the country (Besharati 2013b). From an OECD 
standpoint, South Africa is a key partner for ‘enhanced engagement’ as part of the K5 
countries – namely Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and South Africa. 
South Africa has also played an active role in calls for the reform of key global development 
institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). While 
the WTO cannot be described as a development institution in the traditional sense, the Doha 
Development Round and its ultimate failure in many respects illustrated how difficult it is to 
square the development and economic growth aspirations of the developing world within the 
strictures of the current global rules of the game. In this context, South Africa also began to 
recognise some of the limitations of working within traditional global development finance 
institutions. Reform of the IMF and the WB has not necessarily strengthened the voice of the 
developing world in those institutions. In fact, in the case of the IMF, South Africa’s influence 
and voice was weakened as its voting share was reduced. This brought to the fore the need 
to consider alternative ways to engage on global development concerns where South Africa 
has a particular interest, such as in the case of Africa. 
2.1.8 South Africa and South-South cooperation 
Parallel to the emergence of greater North-South engagement around key African priorities, 
the South African government also responded to the emergence of key economies from the 
South. Its approach was sparked primarily by the increasing engagement by China since the 
mid-1990s in South Africa’s own region. China’s influence in Africa manifested itself not only 
in the building of sport stadiums, houses of parliament and presidential palaces following 
several high-profile and regular visits by the Chinese leadership, but more significantly in the 
expansion of trade and investment, particularly in Africa’s mineral and energy complex. 
The global rise of China and associated realignment of relative power and influence did not 
go unnoticed in South Africa. However, it is also the rise of two other major economies in the 
South, India and Brazil, that was seized upon particularly during the Mbeki presidency to 
align South Africa with a group of emerging democracies that are willing to accept a global 
role and responsibility with respect to their regions. This culminated in the establishment of 
the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Forum. However, the establishment of BRIC (Brazil, 
Russia, India and China) under the impetus of Russian President Medvedev in 2009 led to 
intensive lobbying by the South African government for South Africa to be part of this group 
of emerging economies. South Africa was admitted to the grouping in 2011, thereby ensuring 
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that a representative from every developing region is now part of the group and also, as 
some would argue, enhancing the group’s credibility to speak on behalf of the developing 
world. 
In tracing the trajectory of the international development discourse of South Africa over the 
past 20 years, it is interesting to note that there are at least three key themes that emerge. 
First, South Africa positions itself squarely in the South (or in the developing world). In 
positioning itself in this region, it identifies both with its plight and global marginalisation. 
Second, by positioning itself in this geographic sphere it also assumes a particular role, 
namely that of actively addressing the marginalisation of the developing world, in particular 
Africa. In the same way that the ANC fought against apartheid, South Africa has taken up the 
cudgels against what it regards as ‘global apartheid’ – the unequal global playing field that 
faces Africa and prevents it from fully participating as an equal in the global community. Thus 
it acts as an advocate for and on behalf of Africa. 
Third, South Africa’s actions and its engagement with global development frameworks also 
position it as a bridge-builder between North and South through various global engagement 
initiatives. However, this role might change as South Africa assesses the value of aligning 
itself with the rising South. 
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3 Institutional framework 
3.1 Rationale for the establishment of a dedicated agency 
Like many other rising development partners, South Africa is hardly a new provider of 
development assistance. Dreher, Fuchs and Nunnenkamp (2013: 403) suggest that what is 
‘new’ is ‘rather the attention that these donors receive in the public debate’. Indeed, South 
Africa has a long-standing track record of providing development assistance to the rest of 
Africa which predates its democratic transition of 1994. As noted by Barber and Barratt 
(1990), Braude et al. (2008) and Vickers (2012), the South African white minority government 
utilised both multilateral and bilateral assistance in the hope of countering its growing 
economic and political isolation following its exit from the Commonwealth in 1961. In the 
following three decades South Africa provided mainly bilateral assistance to African countries 
such as Swaziland, Malawi, Lesotho, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Comores and Zaire 
(present-day DRC), but also Paraguay, in an effort to secure if not outright political and 
economic support – particularly for its anti-communist campaign against the backdrop of 
Cold War rivalry on the continent – at least tolerance and non-interference in its affairs. The 
main vehicle for the channelling of this support was the Economic Cooperation Promotion 
Loan Fund (ECPLF), which was located in the Department of Foreign Affairs, the precursor 
of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) (Besharati 2013b). 
Internally, South Africa also provided ‘external assistance’ to the ‘homelands’, so-called 
quasi-independent but internationally unrecognised ‘black states’ located within South 
Africa’s borders, in which black South Africans were expected to express their political 
aspirations. 
The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), a key South African development finance 
institution through which present-day South Africa engages in regional and bilateral 
development projects, had its origin here.14 Established in 1983, it was mainly responsible for 
providing technical assistance to the homelands, to support the expansion of their hard and 
soft infrastructure as well as small business and medium-sized enterprise development. 
However, South Africa’s rejoining of the international community post-1994, and the 
formation of its ambitious African Agenda under the Mandela but more specifically the Mbeki 
presidencies, prompted a hasty rethink of the instruments available to South Africa to see 
this agenda through. By 2000, the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund 
(ARICF) – also known as ARF – had been set up by an Act of Parliament to replace the 
ECPLF. Located in the Department of Foreign Affairs, the fund had initial capital of US$30m, 
a residual of the remaining funds of the ECPLF (Vickers 2012). The Act also made provision 
for the annual replenishment of the fund through parliamentary allocations and the provision 
of a rolling budget to enable the building up of capital and reserves through funds that were 
not spent in a particular budget year. 
Both Vickers (2012) and Besharati (2013b) suggest that the ARF was explicitly a foreign 
policy tool. This is an important observation with respect to the future role of the much-
mooted SADPA. The elaboration of the objectives of the ARF, as set out in its 2011 annual 
report, bears this out, namely: supporting cooperation between South Africa and other 
countries; promoting democracy and good governance; preventing conflict and assisting with 
conflict resolution; supporting socioeconomic development and integration; providing 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in Africa; and lastly, providing technical 
assistance and capacity building, specifically in terms of human resource development, 
                                               
14 As noted by Besharati (2013b), the DBSA Act was reviewed in 1997 to expand its mandate to development projects in 
Southern Africa. 
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management training and scholarships (Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation 2011a). 
Besharati (2013b: 19) goes further and remarks that the ‘fund was envisioned not [our 
emphasis] as an instrument to provide aid but rather to establish partnerships, demonstrate 
solidarity and support the economic empowerment of Africa’. This approach positions South 
Africa’s development approach squarely within the South-South cooperation discourse. 
Indeed, an overview of the types of activities that received support from the ARF seems to 
bear this out, namely support to South Africa’s participation in the AU observer mission to the 
Sudan general elections, election support to Zimbabwe, implementation of bilateral 
agreements with African partner countries, support of peace processes in Burundi and DRC, 
post-conflict reconstruction activities in DRC and Comores, humanitarian assistance to 
various African countries, and a range of public administration capacity building activities in 
fragile states in Africa. Notably, it also included support to small business development 
initiatives through the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry. 
The management structure of the ARF consisted of an Advisory Committee made up of 
seven members who were all from government departments, namely five representatives 
from DIRCO, one representative from the National Treasury and one representative from the 
Department of Trade and Industry. The Advisory Committee was chaired by the Director 
General of DIRCO who recommended projects for approval to the Minister of Finance and 
the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation (Vickers 2012). 
While some argue that the disbursements of the ARF constituted only 3–4 per cent of South 
Africa’s entire development cooperation, it is worth noting that the annual disbursements 
rose to around ZAR200–300m a year (Braude et al. 2008; Besharati 2013b). In addition, 
cooperation with trilateral (mainly Northern) partners had boosted the capacity and the reach 
of the ARF significantly. To ensure alignment with South Africa’s African Agenda, the ARF 
was located in the same section where the NEPAD division was in DIRCO to ensure close 
cooperation and synergy with South Africa’s NEPAD objectives. 
Despite the ‘success’ of the ARF to enable the mobilisation of funds for priorities in the region 
and as a foreign policy tool, some observers note that its operational framework had a 
significant impact on its operational efficiency and capacity, as well as on its transparency 
and strategic focus. 
Vickers (2012) suggests that first, the absence of a project management office and clear 
methodology aligned with South Africa’s foreign policy objectives had a significant impact on 
the identification and selection of projects and South Africa’s strategic positioning – resulting 
in a process and approach that tended to be both ad hoc and reactive. Second, there 
seemed to be significant delays in the disbursement of ARF grants because of poor 
coordination between the two lead ministries. This was exacerbated by the lack of effective 
monitoring and impact assessment of the projects in recipient countries. The lack of effective 
oversight was aggravated by the lack of capacity and appropriate skill-sets in South African 
embassies that are tasked with this mandate in recipient countries. This has resulted in a 
lack of consultation with affected stakeholders and the strategic location of these 
engagements in a developmental framework. Third, there is significant criticism that the 
peace dividend that was the outcome of South Africa’s elaborate, comprehensive and costly 
peace-building efforts in the region had not translated into a financial dividend to South Africa 
through more trade, access to markets and resources or opportunities to participate in large 
infrastructure projects. Qobo (2010) noted that South Africa Inc in particular remained and 
continues to remain excluded from major capital projects in the region that are financed by 
international finance institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank. As discussed later in this 
report, this is partly the result of the absence of a strategic partnership between the 
government and the private sector that could both harness and bolster the full competencies 
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of South Africa as an effective development partner in the region, and partly also the nature 
of South Africa’s development finance. Lastly, Besharati offers additional shortcomings, 
namely a focus on disbursements rather than on carefully tracking expenditure, and more 
importantly, a lack of transparency that has led to serious accusations by opposition parties 
in Parliament that the fund is ‘[propping] up rogue states and countries with a history of 
human rights abuses’ (PMG 2011, cited in Besharati 2013b: 33). These shortcomings and 
criticisms offer useful lessons for the future conceptualisation and operationalisation of 
SADPA. 
However, with this latter criticism in mind it is also worth reflecting whether the South African 
government employs the principles of solidarity and ‘non-interference’ in all its engagements 
in the region. The request for a ZAR2.5bn loan by the government of Swaziland in 2011 to 
South Africa is instructive. South Africa granted the request but attached a range of 
conditions to the loan. These included compliance with fiscal and technical reforms required 
by the IMF; confidence-building measures by the Swazi government; capacity building 
support from South Africa; and lastly, cooperation on multilateral issues. As noted by Vickers 
(2012), the most political of these conditionalities was a request by the South African 
government for the initiation of a domestic dialogue in Swaziland towards political reform with 
clear milestones and timeframes. The Swaziland government eventually opted not to take up 
the loan. South Africa has taken a much more lenient approach towards Zimbabwe, although 
a public outcry followed in 2013 when Tendai Biti, the Finance Minister (from the Movement 
for Democratic Change (MDC)) under the Global Political Agreement, announced that South 
Africa had approved a US$100m loan to support the Zimbabwe elections. South African 
government officials responded by saying that the terms were still under discussion. It is 
unclear whether the loan was extended to the Zimbabwe government in the end. 
3.1.1 Diverse actors in South Africa’s development partnerships and 
assistance 
Before discussing the structure, modalities and mandate of SADPA it is useful to reflect why 
the ARF – arguably historically South Africa’s premier official development assistance tool – 
is regarded as having contributed so little to South Africa’s overall offering. 
The reason for this is that there are a diverse group of public institutions, but also private 
institutions, that have been involved in South African development activities in the rest of 
Africa. As noted earlier, the South African Institute of International Affairs study found that 
almost half of South Africa’s government departments were engaged in one or other form of 
international cooperation (Braude et al. 2008). These included the obvious candidates, such 
as the departments of Public Service and Administration (through exchanges and capacity 
building); Education (mainly through the provision of bursaries and scholarships); Defence 
(through support to regional peacekeeping operations); and Trade and Industry. However, 
other less obvious departments are also included, such as Mineral Resources, Science and 
Technology; Justice and Constitutional Development (although this seems obvious given the 
significant need to provide assistance in post-conflict state-building and restorative justice in 
the region); the Police Service; Agriculture; Energy; Public Works; and lastly, Public 
Enterprises. Apart from direct bilateral line department cooperation, there are numerous 
South African public institutions and bodies, including parastatals, that provide 
developmental support to countries in the region. These include the Public Administration 
Leadership and Management Academy (PALAMA), the Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (CSIR), Statistics South Africa, the South African Revenue Service (SARS) and 
the Reserve Bank – mainly providing technical support and capacity building – the National 
Research Foundation, as well as SOEs including DBSA (already mentioned), the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC), Eskom, Telkom, Portnet and Transnet (Besharati 2013b). 
The accumulation of these individual interventions alongside the totality of South Africa’s 
peacekeeping, electoral and regional support have led the authors of an internal Treasury 
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review conducted among all line departments in 2006 to conclude that South Africa’s ‘ODA’ 
is comparable with countries such as Sweden and Norway. Alden and Le Pere (2010) 
calculated that in 2004 South Africa’s public and private outflows to Africa amounted to 
ZAR1.6bn, while another study suggested that by 2006, South Africa’s total development 
assistance was closer to US$363–475m or 0.18 per cent of the country’s GDP, and 0.36 per 
cent if SACU transfers were included (Braude et al. 2008). More recent assessments have 
revised the estimates significantly upwards to respectively 0.7 per cent (Vickers 2012) and 1 
per cent (Grimm 2011) of the country’s GNI, suggesting that South Africa is surpassing even 
the ODA target set for traditional donors. 
However, these figures have to be dealt with circumspectly given the underlying data gaps, 
as well as some disputes about whether some of the data included here (such as South 
Africa’s transfers to the SACU member states) constitute a real contribution to development 
assistance, even though South African government officials might view it in this way 
(Maphalala 2007).15 More importantly, in terms of the OECD-DAC definition of aid, there 
clearly are different definitions of what constitutes South African development assistance. 
These differences become less important when considering South Africa’s development 
cooperation offering from a South-South cooperation definitional standpoint. Nevertheless, 
there is no disputing the fact that South Africa is Africa’s leading African development 
assistance partner. 
3.2 The South African Development Partnership Agency 
The establishment of a South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) was first 
mooted at the ANC’s July 2007 preparatory policy conference and then subsequently 
formally adopted during the 52nd National Conference in Polokwane the same year. As 
noted in resolution 21 and 22 (ANC 2007): 
(21) The idea of a Developmental Partnership is one of the key strategies that could 
assist the ANC and government in pursuit of our vision for a better Africa. The 
Development Partnership will enhance our agenda on international relations which 
rests on three pillars namely; (i) consolidation of the African agenda, (ii) South-South 
and (iii) North-South cooperation. 
(22) The national budgetary processes should commit the necessary resources to 
such a developmental partnership. The fund should be located in the Department of 
Foreign Affairs [later renamed Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation] as is the current situation, functioning as the African Renaissance Fund. 
The adoption of the resolutions was informed by recognition of the need to rationalise and 
coordinate South Africa’s various development interventions more effectively (Department of 
International Relations and Cooperation 2012). A wide-ranging consultation process followed 
over the next five years, which included several peer learning visits to development agencies 
in the North and in the South, the commissioning of a variety of studies and papers, as well 
as external and internal consultations within the interdepartmental cluster on international 
relations and cooperation, trade and security, and with the South African Parliament to 
develop a business case for the establishment of SADPA. Besharati (2013b: 34) notes that in 
South Africa’s peer learning approach, ‘special attention was given to models of development 
assistance in post-conflict environments, as this… [was] particularly relevant to the African 
context’. While the South African Parliament approved the initial concept note and framework 
in December 2009 a great deal of work followed, led by DIRCO and the Technical Assistance 
                                               
15 Trevor Manual, the South African Minister of Finance, urged the revisiting of the SACU revenue-sharing agreement following 
the surge in South African imports resulting in the transfer of R14.1bn to the Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland 
(BLNS) economies in the financial year to March 2007. One SARS senior official commented that, ‘This is development aid 
disguised as revenue sharing.’ 
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Unit (TAU) of the National Treasury, to identify the best model for the establishment of 
SADPA as a public entity. 
Informed by the aforementioned wide-ranging consultation process, a business case for 
SADPA was presented to an interdepartmental evaluation committee consisting of the 
departments of International Relations and Cooperation, Finance, and Public Service and 
Administration recommending the establishment of the agency as a ‘Section 3a public entity’. 
The proposal was adopted by the ministers of the relevant departments in April 2012. While 
the proposal called for the establishment of a separate agency under the Public Service 
Amendment Act, 2007 (Act 30 of 2007), it also proposed the creation of a new Partnership 
Fund for Development, which would repeal the ARF and transfer its assets and funds to the 
newly established fund (Besharati 2013b; Vickers 2012; Department of International 
Relations and Cooperation 2013a). 
According to Besharati (2013b), an initial draft bill to Parliament to effect the proposed 
recommendations was first rejected by Parliament, but then re-tabled and approved in 
December 2012. Nonetheless, while the Department of Public Service and Administration 
(DPSA) has apparently prepared a proclamation for the establishment of the agency to be 
signed by the president and for publication in the Government Gazette during the course of 
2013, this has not yet happened.16 According to the annual departmental report (Department 
of International Relations and Cooperation 2013a), the reason for the delay is largely 
because of the required approval processes to establish such an entity. However, it seems 
the technical work has continued to prepare an Institutional, Strategic and Operations 
framework for SADPA, which would include ‘a human-resource plan and competency 
framework, medium-term budget, programming portfolios, strategic framework, operational 
systems, policy guidelines, legal procedures, tools and instruments for project design, 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and a financial accountability of SADPA’ (Besharati 2013b: 
35; Vickers 2012; Department of International Relations and Cooperation 2013a). 
3.3 Structure, decision-making processes, financing and 
accountability mechanisms 
While SADPA will be established as a separate agency of government, it will operate under 
the executive authority of the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and thus 
will receive its policy direction from DIRCO.17 As noted in the DIRCO (2012, Part 3: 16) 
Annual Report 2011 – 2012, the main objectives and functions of SADPA will be as follows: 
● The agency will be responsible for all South Africa’s outgoing international 
development cooperation and assistance, including bilateral, trilateral and multilateral 
partnerships with countries, development institutions, civil society and the private 
sector. 
● The agency will coordinate operational policy formulation on South African 
development cooperation and ensure coherence through government departments. 
● The agency will utilise the Partnership Fund for Development to support the financial 
commitments of development cooperation initiatives, programmes and projects. 
In addition to the above objectives and functions, SADPA’s role was further elaborated 
through the addition of three more objectives in a formal DIRCO (2013c) response to 
Parliament, namely: 
                                               
16 Neither the Bill nor the Act has been gazetted at the time of writing of this report. 
17 As noted in the Annual Report 2012–2013 (DIRCO 2013a, Part E: 2), ‘DIRCO will continue to assume its responsibilities for 
South Africa’s foreign relations and for policy matters, while the agency’s role will focus on the development, delivery and 
management of all South Africa’s outgoing development cooperation.’ 
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● Conduct an annual accountability audit and M&E for all South Africa’s outgoing 
development co-operation. 
● Ensure effective management and administration of the Partnership Fund for 
Development. 
● Promote and market SADPA and its projects. 
While the formal structures and decision-making processes will remain unclear until the 
promulgation of the SADPA Bill and the Partnership Fund for Development Bill, the contours 
of the lines of authority and decision-making seem to be largely informed by some of the 
accountability gaps that characterised the operationalisation of the ARF, as well as the 
adoption of best practice prevalent in the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) of several 
development cooperation agencies – both in the North and in the South. As noted in a 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group report (2011), it is expected that SADPA would operate 
under the direct political oversight of one of DIRCO’s two deputy ministers, but nonetheless 
operate as a semi-autonomous government agency whose executive head, at the level of 
deputy director general, would report directly to the DIRCO director general. The body is 
expected to be governed by an advisory board of 11 members who would include 
representatives from the Treasury, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the 
Department of Science and Technology, the presidency and DIRCO. It is also suggested that 
provision would be made for representation by academia, labour and business, alongside 
other technical experts on the board. The advisory board would meet on a quarterly basis to 
review proposals and progress of projects, as well as to approve budgets and plans. 
Moreover, the agency itself would be staffed initially by around 20 staff members, including 
development specialists, legal and financial management experts and diplomats, increasing 
to 50 staff members in the longer term. 
As noted earlier, SADPA is expected to inherit the existing funding of the ARF, which is 
assessed to be around ZAR1bn. In addition, it will receive a yearly allocation of ZAR500m 
through parliamentary appropriation in line with the current ARF arrangement, with the 
understanding that unused funds may be rolled over into the next funding period, thus 
allowing the Agency to build its funding base over time (Besharati 2013b). Vickers (2012) 
notes that the income of the Partnership Fund for Development would also be supported by 
loan repayments, accumulated interest, investments, revenue from projects, and public and 
private donations and contributions (through the private sector, philanthropic and charitable 
organisations and investors). 
More importantly, contributions from foreign donors are expected to make up the bulk of the 
funding at the disposal of SADPA. Besharati (2013b) suggests that the ratio of domestic 
funds managed by SADPA may be greatly eclipsed by foreign funding coming into the fund 
under a trilateral cooperation framework. While many of South Africa’s previous flagship 
South-South cooperation projects would not have been possible without the support of 
foreign funders, this does raise a question about the level of donor influence in the 
engagement of South Africa.18 It is unclear whether SADPA will become the main agency 
through which all of South Africa’s contributions towards South-South cooperation and 
development initiatives would be channelled, such as South Africa’s annual contribution to 
the IBSA Fund trilateral cooperation fund or South Africa’s numerous contributions to 
multilateral institutions or humanitarian organisations. What is clear though is that very few of 
South Africa’s government departments are expected to willingly give up their wide-ranging 
international engagement in regional capacity building initiatives, having developed 
substantial international cooperation departments within their bureaucracies. 
                                               
18 Many of South Africa’s flagship South-South cooperation initiatives, such as the South African police training throughout 
Africa or the engagement of PALAMA in regional capacity building, would not have happened without significant foreign donor 
support. The South African Police capacity building project in Sudan was, for example, made possible by Norwegian support. 
Also note Besharati (2013b). 
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Will the establishment of SADPA make a substantial difference to the way that South Africa 
has traditionally engaged in South-South cooperation initiatives? While Besharati (2013b) 
argues that SADPA, in essence, corresponds very closely to the ARF both in substance and 
form, Vickers (2012) suggests that it will introduce significant improvements in its approach 
and management of South Africa’s South-South cooperation. Specifically, the inclusion of a 
clearly defined assessment methodology, which would include a more rigorous assessment 
of impact through closer monitoring and evaluation of cooperation activities,19 accompanied 
by the framing of all development cooperation projects in bilateral agreements between 
South Africa and its partners, would contribute substantially towards countering the ad hoc 
approach that characterised the ARF contributions, while also encouraging local ownership 
among partners. Perhaps more interestingly, Vickers (2012) argues that the broader funding 
base of SADPA, with much more significant participation by external funders, would 
encourage South Africa to prioritise projects that would support its good governance agenda 
in the region alongside its focus on institutional capacity building in Africa. SADPA would 
thus emerge as a vehicle to enhance South Africa’s normative and soft-power role in the 
region.20 Lastly, he posits that SADPA’s approach and activities would be guided by the 
African Platform for Development Effectiveness adopted in the run-up to Busan 2011. 
While broadly speaking this assessment is valid, given that South Africa’s key focus is on the 
continent and it would surely be guided by the demands of its African partners, it should be 
noted that South Africa, alongside other Southern providers, is hesitant to be locked into a 
development cooperation framework that transfers responsibilities to it on a par with 
traditional donors; therefore, the insertion into the Busan declaration of voluntary participation 
by Southern providers alongside the proviso that while they would be working towards 
common goals they would have differential responsibilities. Hence, any attempt to allocate 
the same type of responsibilities or aid effectiveness methodologies to South Africa as those 
allocated to Northern providers would be approached with caution. However, Besharati 
(2013b: 51) suggests that the most important factor which should not be overlooked in 
placing SADPA on a very different path than that of its predecessor, is the quality of its staff 
and whether the recruitment process ‘will be done in a competitive, thorough and fair 
manner, without political interference’. SADPA provides an opportunity for South Africa to 
professionalise and systematise its approach. More importantly, given that SADPA has also 
identified the need to work closely with civil society and other actors outside government on 
South Africa’s regional capacity building and South-South cooperation efforts, SADPA offers 
a unique opportunity to leverage the total South African offering and capacity in this area – 
including civilian, private sector and state-driven capacities. 
3.4 Implementation mechanisms (e.g. bilateral, trilateral, 
multilateral) 
South Africa’s development and South-South cooperation has traditionally been exercised 
through a variety of actors and modes of engagement. South Africa is a regular contributor to 
concessional lending institutions with a focus on Africa, such as the World Bank (WB) and 
the African Development Bank (AfDB). It is a permanent member and third largest 
shareholder (after the United States and Japan) in the AfDB and the only African contributor 
to the AfDB’s African Development Fund.21 South Africa is also the only African country that 
contributes to the funding base of the International Development Association (IDA), a WB 
development facility for low-income countries. In addition, South Africa contributes to a range 
                                               
19 Here it is important to note that the indicators need to be developed against which to measure impact. Emerging development 
partners do not wish to be evaluated against externally created indicators. 
20 His point is that because SADPA would not be acting as a grant-maker and dispenser of funds in the primary instance, given 
the diverse origin of its funding base, but rather acting in a facilitating role to channel funds through financial institutions, it would 
encourage South Africa to support projects with this objective in mind. 
21 The AfDB Fund is 99 per cent funded by Northern donors. 
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of multilateral funds and facilities – such as the Commonwealth Fund for Technical 
Cooperation, the Vaccination Fund and the Global Environmental Trust Fund (Vickers 2012). 
The 2011 South African White Paper (Department of International Relations and Cooperation 
2011b) on foreign policy notes: 
The South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) will be an important 
instrument to promote more effective development cooperation. It will therefore 
pursue bilateral cooperation with African countries as well as trilateral cooperation 
with international partners in support of African development. 
As noted earlier, many of South Africa’s South-South capacity building initiatives would not 
have been possible without trilateral cooperation support from other partners, mainly 
Northern donors. It is noteworthy in this respect that the DIRCO Annual Report 2011–2012 
indicates under its outcome area for Technical and Development Cooperation that trilateral 
cooperation arrangements have been explored with 15 [foreign] development agencies, and 
in-principle agreements have been reached for trilateral cooperation. Indeed, a cursory 
review of the country assistance programmes of some of the key donor agencies involved in 
South Africa, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and 
the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), in addition to comments from donor 
representatives during the course of this research, indicate substantial interest and 
commitment to support South Africa’s cooperation activities in the region.22 
Key institutions and mechanisms employed include the ARF, which has already been 
discussed, a range of government departments as noted earlier, including a dedicated 
Peacekeeping Fund of the Department of Defence, and also statutory bodies such as the 
Independent Electoral Commission, the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), the 
National Research Foundation, the PALAMA, SARS, the Reserve Bank, and Statistics South 
Africa. SARS in particular is regarded as a world leader in the way that it manages revenue 
collection, customs management and domestic resource mobilisation. It is thus no surprise 
that South Africa is an engaged partner in the Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative 
(CABRI) and in the African Tax Administration Forum. The Reserve Bank likewise plays a 
key role in the C-10 (representing the Committee of Ten African Ministers of Finance and 
Central Bank Governors) while Statistics South Africa has been instrumental, with the help of 
the AfDB, in strengthening data collection and statistical analysis. South Africa’s strengths in 
public financial management are also evident in its development finance institutions, which 
are at the forefront of South Africa’s development cooperation efforts. The most important 
among these are the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC). While South Africa has pursued South-South trilateral 
cooperation initiatives with countries like Cuba and Vietnam in the rest of Africa (Besharati 
2013b), the most prominent example of South African participation in trilateral South-South 
cooperation is its participation in the IBSA Fund for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation. 
However, more recently, South Africa is also part of a discussion on the establishment of a 
BRICS Development Bank. The establishment of such a bank could potentially have far-
reaching consequences for Africa (should its mandate include projects outside of the BRICS 
members), given the huge infrastructure needs on the continent. 
3.4.1 DBSA and the IDC 
Both the DBSA and the IDC have a broader remit than South Africa, having been established 
initially to support development initiatives in South Africa. Their regional assistance has been 
mainly through infrastructure development and loans. Both have units dedicated to providing 
assistance to NEPAD and the African Agenda. 
                                               
22 See JICA Country Assistance Policy for the Republic of South Africa, December, 2012 and USAID, Country Development 
Cooperation Strategy, Public Version, Fiscal Year 2013-2017, South Africa, April 2013. 
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The IDC, established in 1940 to foster industrial development in South Africa, has a private 
sector focus with an interest in mining and beneficiation, agro-processing, tourism, public–
private partnerships, health care, infrastructure and manufacturing. It began its operations 
outside South Africa in 1998. According to its 2012 annual report, the IDC approved an 
estimated ZAR20.1bn in funding projects in the rest of the continent from 2001 to 2010. By 
March 2013, the IDC’s exposure towards the rest of Africa stood at ZAR6.8bn in more than 
20 countries. A breakdown of key projects in 2012 provides a broad overview of the spread 
of activities involving the IDC across the continent (Industrial Development Corporation 
2012).23  
Table 3.1 Overview of range of IDC projects in the rest of Africa, 2012 
Country Sector 
Angola Energy 
Botswana Tourism 
DRC Franchising 
Ethiopia Agriculture and agro-processing 
Ghana ICT, tourism 
Kenya Energy, agriculture and agro-processing 
Malawi Franchising, agriculture and agro-processing 
Mauritius ICT 
Mozambique Agriculture and agro-processing, mining, energy, franchising 
Namibia Manufacturing, agriculture and agro-processing, mining 
Senegal Infrastructure 
Sudan Infrastructure 
Swaziland Financial services, agriculture and agro-processing, manufacturing 
Tanzania Agriculture and agro-processing 
Uganda Tourism 
Zambia Health care, transport and logistics 
Zimbabwe Financial services, mining 
Source: Adapted from Industrial Development Corporation (2012). 
Some of the key projects include the building of its flagship project Mozal in Mozambique 
(1998–2000 for phase 1 and 2001–2003 for phase 2), the construction of a hydroelectric 
plant in Cahora Bassa in Mozambique (2008), a hospital in Zambia (2009) and a cement 
factory in Namibia (2010) (Besharati 2013b). The IDC also provides training through its 
Operational Training Unit to development finance institutions from the rest of the continent, 
having trained staff from 17 institutions from the rest of Africa in 2013 (Industrial 
Development Corporation 2013). It has a cooperation agreement with the Brazilian 
Development Bank, Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico Social (BNDES), with 
the view to support joint financing of projects in Africa. 
The DBSA has a stronger public sector focus and has financed infrastructure projects 
elsewhere in the region between 2006 and 2009 to the tune of ZAR60bn ― mainly in energy, 
telecommunications, mining, transport, water, manufacturing and health (Sidiropoulos 2012). 
A media release by the DBSA (2011) predicted that its annual Africa investment approvals 
would exceed US$1bn by 2011 – mainly focusing on the transport sector. This was 
confirmed by its 2012 annual report, which reflected a loan book of ZAR10bn a year to Africa 
(Development Bank of Southern Africa 2012). The DBSA, alongside the Treasury, structures 
development loans and sovereign lending to countries in the region. It is able to leverage its 
                                               
23 At this time the IDC was involved in 41 projects in 17 countries mainly related to mining, industrial infrastructure, agro-
processing and tourism (mainly hotels). 
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own funds with credit lines from other development finance institutions including from 
Germany, France and Japan. Besharati (2013b: 44) notes that while its funding is neither 
concessional nor as competitive as commercial loans, the DBSA ‘offers a project preparation 
facility and a package of technical assistance, research and scoping grants, which make it an 
attractive local loan provider’. More importantly, it works closely with the well-integrated 
South African banking system. Discussions are currently underway to establish a 
Development Bank International, which will extend the bank’s remit to the entire continent. It 
is expected that the DBSA will be a key partner of SADPA in South Africa’s development 
cooperation, with the possibility of working closely together in the same way that the German 
Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau and GIZ work together. Besharati (ibid.: 44) suggests that 
the DBSA ‘could potentially be one of the external financiers of SADPA as well as an 
implementer of its activities, and SADPA could cushion the DBSA’s loans through the 
provision of concessional grants and technical assistance’. This makes the case for strong 
technical and financial capacities within SADPA. 
3.4.2 The IBSA Fund 
Established in June 2003 under the leadership of the Singh, Lula and Mbeki administrations, 
the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum represents an important platform to 
strengthen political and economic cooperation between these Southern democracies. 
Regarded as a novel form of South-South cooperation, the three countries share a broad 
interest in the reform of the global governance agenda, with a particular focus on trade, 
finance, climate change and security. All three countries also aspire to permanent seats on 
an expanded UN Security Council. IBSA, which is underpinned by an informal dialogue 
approach, has established a strongly embedded functional cooperation over the past ten 
years with 16 technical working groups operating cross-sectorally on a number of objectives. 
The functional cooperation is underpinned by 20 agreements to support these objectives. 
Heads of government meet every two years, with the last summit supposed to have taken 
place in the latter half of 2013 in India, although it was postponed. 
IBSA launched the IBSA Fund for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation in 2004 (which became 
operational in 2006) with the view to sharing and supporting innovative approaches towards 
combating poverty and hunger in developing countries. The substantive South-South 
principles that underpin the IBSA Fund include: national ownership, mutual benefit, 
horizontality and equality, non-conditionality, and complementarity to North-South 
Cooperation (NSC) (Simplicio et al. 2013). The IBSA Fund also utilises ten substantive 
criteria through which proposed projects are assessed. These include: 
● reduction of poverty and hunger 
● national ownership and leadership 
● South-South cooperation 
● use of IBSA country capacities 
● strengthening of local capacity 
● ownership 
● sustainability 
● identifiable impact 
● replicability 
● innovation. 
South Africa, like the other IBSA members, contributes US$1m per year to the Fund, which is 
managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Special Unit for South-
South Cooperation and overseen by officials from the three countries in New York. The IBSA 
Fund has raised US$25.2m since its establishment in 2004 and has allocated US$17.6m to 
16 different projects. The contributions to projects have covered the following sectors: 
agriculture (29.6 per cent), livelihoods/waste management (22.5 per cent), health care (20 
per cent), water (9.8 per cent), youth and sport (6.5 per cent), governance and security (6.1 
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per cent) and renewable energy (5.3 per cent). In addition, projects in Africa received 45.4 
per cent of the funds, while 19.2 per cent was spent in Asia, 12.8 per cent in the Arab world 
and 22.3 per cent in Latin America. Around 73.7 per cent of the recipients were classified as 
LDCs, while the remaining 26.3 per cent were other developing countries (Simplicio et al. 
2013). 
Projects are not executed by IBSA members only, rather various UN agencies and other 
partners are involved, with a strong emphasis on local ownership. Projects in Guinea-Bissau, 
Cape Verde, Cambodia, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Sierra Leone, Laos and Burundi that 
have received support have been diverse, covering activities such as reducing violence in 
urban slums and delivering safe drinking water (Vickers 2012). The IBSA Fund has received 
several awards. However, there are some concerns that the channelling of funds through the 
UNDP increases the administration costs of the projects significantly (Besharati 2013a). 
More importantly, with the establishment of BRICS, which is much closer to the ideal of a G8 
of the South, there are increasing questions, despite remonstrations to the contrary, about 
the continued relevance of IBSA (Al Doyaili, Freytag and Draper 2013; Mokoena 2007; 
Shubin 2013). However, Sidiropoulos suggests that there might be room for these ‘three 
large pluralistic, multi-cultural and multi-racial societies from three continents’ that are 
committed to ‘inclusive sustainable development, in pursuit of the well-being for their 
peoples’ to focus on developing a stronger caucus within the BRICS on priorities identified 
within the BRICS’ (IBSA 2011, cited in Sidiropoulos 2013: 285–6).24 It is still too early to tell 
whether the IBSA countries are coalescing around common positions in the BRICS. 
3.4.3 The BRICS Bank 
South Africa is a latecomer to the BRICS Forum established in 2009, having only joined the 
grouping in 2011. The outcome of an extensive lobbying process by South Africa, President 
Zuma was invited by President Hu Jintao to attend the 3rd BRIC summit in China in April 
2011 (Shubin 2013). There have been reservations about South Africa’s membership of the 
club given the relative size of its economy, its population size and relative political and 
economic clout, and questions about whether it could really be considered a ‘rising emerging 
economy’. South Africa was certainly not part of the BRIC construct coined by the Goldman 
Sachs economist Jim O’Neill in 2001 in terms of identifying the next frontiers of economic 
growth and investment possibilities. Yet, as noted by Kornegay (2009), ‘from an African 
perspective, South Africa’s exclusion from BRIC could complicate the nature and dynamics 
of the whole notion of South-South cooperation to such an extent as to conceptually call it 
into question as an expression of global South cohesiveness’. Indeed, South Africa’s 
subsequent engagement in the BRICS group has prioritised African issues as a core theme. 
This was most strongly evident in the Durban Summit hosted by South Africa from 26–27 
March 2013, under the theme ‘BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration 
and Industrialisation’. 
The BRIC countries are significant investors and partners of Africa in their own right, and with 
South Africa, they represent an important source of new investment capital in the region. 
Article 5 of the eThekwini Declaration (2013) specifically underscores the importance of 
framing the BRICS engagement within the context of the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD), with specific regard for the range of African AU-led plans and 
programmes focused on infrastructure development and industrialisation, including the 
Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), the AU NEPAD Africa Action 
Plan (2010-2015), the NEPAD Presidential Infrastructure Championing Initiative (PICI), and 
lastly, the Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plans that identify priority 
infrastructure development projects that are critical to promoting regional integration and 
                                               
24 IBSA Summit communiqué, 18 October 2011, Pretoria, South Africa. IBSA: India-Brazil-South Africa, at www.ibsa-
trilateral.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=164&Itemid=92. 
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industrialisation. More importantly, under the leadership of the South African host, the BRICS 
pledged their ‘support for sustainable infrastructure development in Africa’. President Zuma 
is one of eight heads of state that coordinate the PICI, which champions the completion of 
nine priority infrastructure projects throughout Africa covering road and rail infrastructure, 
fibre-optic networks, gas pipelines and water management systems. 
In an innovation introduced by the South African host, several African representatives and 
leaders were invited to a BRICS Leaders-Africa Dialogue Forum as part of a BRICS-Africa 
outreach initiative on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Durban with the theme, 
‘Unlocking Africa’s potential: BRICS and Africa Cooperation on Infrastructure’.25 The 
outreach initiative was posited as ‘an opportunity for BRICS and African leaders to discuss 
how to strengthen cooperation between the BRICS countries and the African Continent’. This 
is in line with South Africa’s intent to articulate and champion the continent’s interests vis-à-
vis the other BRIC members and, more specifically, to engage them in the regional 
integration, infrastructure and industrial development plans and aspirations of the continent. 
At the meeting, South Africa undertook to inform the African side on an ongoing basis about 
developments and proposals regarding BRICS and Africa cooperation through the AU 
Assembly (BRICS 2013). 
South Africa’s special outreach approach to the African representatives was not entirely 
without controversy, with a senior Indian representative noting rather peevishly after the 
Summit that South Africa ‘had jumped the gun’, given that the BRICS Forum ‘has not yet 
developed an official outreach strategy’ – despite several countries clamouring to join the 
club or to have observer status.26 Also in Africa, questions have been raised in some 
quarters as to whether South Africa is able to represent African interests in the grouping. 
Nonetheless, on the whole, South Africa’s efforts to ensure that the BRICS takes African 
interests seriously are recognised both in the region and further afield.27 
Importantly, inter-BRICS cooperation is gathering pace, with a range of secondary meetings 
proposed in the run-up to the sixth BRICS Summit, including meetings of the BRICS 
ministers of foreign affairs on the margins of UNGA; meetings of the finance ministers and 
Central Bank governors on the margins of G20 meetings, WB/IMF meetings, as well as other 
stand-alone meetings; meetings of the BRICS trade ministers on the margins of multilateral 
events, or stand-alone meetings; consultations among BRICS permanent missions and/or 
embassies, as appropriate, in New York, Vienna, Rome, Paris, Washington, Nairobi and 
Geneva; and lastly, consultative meetings of BRICS senior officials on the margins of 
relevant sustainable development, environment and climate-related international fora, where 
appropriate. 
A development that has elicited a great deal of interest is the creation of a BRICS 
Development Bank. As an outcome of the Delhi Declaration at the end of the fourth BRICS 
Summit in 2012, and the second Summit that South Africa officially participated in, the 
BRICS announced that they would set up a ‘BRICS-led South-South development bank’. As 
noted in the eThekwini Declaration (2013) on 27 March 2013 in Durban: 
Developing countries face challenges of infrastructure development due to insufficient 
long-term financing and foreign direct investment, especially investment in capital 
stock. This constrains global aggregate demand. BRICS cooperation towards more 
productive use of global financial resources can make a positive contribution to 
                                               
25 Africa was represented by the Chairperson of the African Union (AU), the Chairperson of the AU Commission, African 
Leaders representing the eight regional economic communities (RECs), as well as the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) Presidential Infrastructure Championing Initiative (PICI). 
26 Confidential interview, South Africa, 2013. 
27 SAIIA with the survey company Ipsos conducted a perceptions survey among foreign policy practitioners in the region during 
2013, where both these perspectives were equally represented –among regional and foreign representatives. 
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addressing this problem. In March 2012 we directed our Finance Ministers to 
examine the feasibility and viability of setting up a New Development Bank for 
mobilising resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in 
BRICS and other emerging economies and developing countries, to supplement the 
existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and 
development. Following the report from our Finance Ministers, we are satisfied that 
the establishment of a New Development Bank is feasible and viable. We have 
agreed to establish the New Development Bank. The initial contribution to the Bank 
should be substantial and sufficient for the Bank to be effective in financing 
infrastructure. 
The DBSA is the principal South African reference bank for the other development banks of 
Brazil, Russia, India and China who are jointly exploring the possibility of establishing a 
BRICS Bank. 
While the South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation announced in 
April 2012 that the BRICS Bank would be officially launched at the 2013 Durban Summit in 
March 2013, this did not happen. Instead, it seems that the technical preparations for the 
bank are continuing. Indeed, as Wood (2014) points out, there remains a great deal to be 
discussed before the bank is established. These include the funding and decision-making 
methodologies; the scope and content of the bank’s activities; and lastly, the preferred 
currency of the bank. 
While discussions are still underway about the nature of the above, Wood suggests that 
South Africa, given its relative size, would support an arrangement whereby each BRICS 
member would contribute US$10bn seed funding. While this would translate in a smaller 
fund, it would enable equal participation and influence of each member. The joining of other 
members (such as Turkey and Indonesia) would presumably mean that they need to match 
the initial contribution to the seed capital, which would equate to equal voting rights for them. 
Infrastructure seems to be a key funding priority for all the BRICS members, but there is 
some discussion around a broadening of this mandate to include sustainable development.28 
However, it is still unclear what the scope of the bank’s activities would be, i.e. would it be 
primarily focused on intra-BRICS activities? Wood (2014) points out that there is a good case 
to be made for investment in developing countries in the regions represented by the BRICS, 
given the potential for higher returns than in the BRICS. In this range of options, South Africa 
clearly favours infrastructure investment in Africa, as illustrated by its BRICS outreach 
initiative in Durban. Lastly, there seems to be some discussion about the possibility that the 
Chinese renminbi might be adopted as the reserve currency of the Bank. While South Africa 
has begun to denominate some of its foreign currency reserves in the yuan, this approach is 
a risk mitigation strategy that is pragmatic rather than signalling a significant shift. 
Indeed, the remarks by Dr Siphamandla Zondi at the BRICS Academic Forum on 18 March 
2014 in Brazil suggest that South Africa views the BRICS Bank as introducing a ‘soft change’ 
from traditional development finance institutions that is pragmatically informed and largely 
focused on meeting an unmatched need. He also argued for close cooperation between the 
BRICS and the regional development banks and the need for the BRICS bank to be an 
enabler and innovator.29 Until all these matters are settled, it is unclear how the BRICS Bank 
would fit into South Africa’s development partnership with its region, although the broad 
outline of South Africa’s priorities is becoming clearer. 
                                               
28 Wood (2014) suggests that the reference in the eThekwini Action Plan to sustainable development might include green 
energy issues, while there is also a need for small business development. 
29 Remarks by Dr Siphamandla Zondi, at the BRICS Academic Forum 2014 in Rio, Brazil, at the session ‘BRICS International 
Development Cooperation’ on 18 March 2014. 
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Civil society and the BRICS 
In exploring the role of civil society in South Africa’s participation in the BRICS, it is important 
to note, as identified by Poskitt (2014, forthcoming), that: 
During 2010 and 2011, debates about whether South Africa should join the BRIC 
group and what membership would look like were being largely had within academic 
circles and think tanks. There was no wide-spread debate within civil society that 
included grassroots organisations, movements and labour groups. The decision to 
join the BRIC group by South Africa came from within the government, with almost no 
consultation with civil society. 
The limited public awareness and engagement with the BRICS process by most South 
African civil society organisations (CSOs) and activists reflects a preoccupation with 
domestic concerns. A disjuncture is noted between global policy processes and South 
Africa’s foreign policy more generally. Poskitt (2014) also remarks that while provision is 
made for an official BRICS Academic Forum and a BRICS Business Forum, there was ‘no 
formal mechanism’ for the involvement or participation of CSOs in the BRICS Summit hosted 
by South Africa. Given the current construct of BRICS–civil society engagement, there are 
only a small number of voices that are steering civil society’s engagement with the BRICS, 
notably residing within South African thinktanks, international non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and certain individuals.30 In addition, a common approach is lacking 
within civil society, with each organisation concentrating on its own priorities ahead of 
collaboration. According to Poskitt (2014), this lack of coordination and collaboration creates 
an accountability gap between South African government decision-making regarding policy 
choices and implications for South African civil society and society more broadly. 
Poskitt proposes that the government should explore the possibility of formalising a multi-
stakeholder partnership that would include government, business, labour and civil society on 
BRICS engagement, as this would result ‘in a more strategic and sustainable outcome for 
South Africa as a whole’. DIRCO has actively sought out opportunities to explain the value of 
the BRICS to South African society through the hosting of several imbizos or public lectures 
at universities and civil society organisations in the run-up to the BRICS Summit. DIRCO is 
also willing to engage thinktanks on their work with regard to the BRICS and South Africa’s 
foreign policy. But Poskitt (2014) emphasised that the delegation of the BRICS Academic 
Forum to Higher Education South Africa (HESA) and the Human Sciences Research Council 
(HSRC) has been problematic, given that neither organisation has extensive research depth 
on the BRICS as a political construct or on its individual members apart from South Africa. 
As an aside, it is noteworthy that South African thinktanks have explored numerous 
partnering and exchange opportunities with their BRICS counterparts, which have been 
facilitated through various bilateral continental policy outreach initiatives by individual BRIC 
members. The most prominent among these has been the establishment of the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2006 that led fairly rapidly to Africa-China academic 
exchanges supported by the FOCAC fund. The India-Africa Forum established in 2008 has 
likewise spurred academic exchanges, while Brazil-South Africa thinktank cooperation has 
also grown.31 These initiatives underscore not only the symbolism of Southern engagement, 
but also the value in supporting South-South research cooperation and could contribute 
towards greater BRICS cohesion on policy matters. This is especially laudable given the 
weak and underdeveloped research depth on African issues in all the BRIC countries. On the 
other hand, Poskitt (2014) also mentions efforts in grassroots CSOs to build people-to-
                                               
30 Poskitt mentions Patrick Bond specifically, who was instrumental in organising the civil society counter- summit, ‘BRICS from 
below’. 
31 Russian-South African academic exchanges and thinktank collaborations are rare despite the historic closeness to Africa 
during the Soviet era. 
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people solidarity through the establishment of BRICS networks. However, most of this 
engagement is on a sectoral or regional basis. 
Poskitt concludes by considering the sustainability of current funding for in-depth research on 
South-South cooperation and the BRICS but also the need more broadly to support policy 
and advocacy initiatives in this area. The prevailing dominance of foreign government 
support for these efforts raises important questions for the way forward. 
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4 Policy debates and non-state actors 
 
A range of actors outside the purview of government are involved in South Africa’s South-
South capacity building initiatives. They are both active practitioners in providing training and 
technical support, and also important players in the discourse that informs South Africa’s 
approach towards South-South cooperation. However, it is extremely difficult to find 
information about the range of civil society ‘development interventions’ in the region as they 
are not centrally coordinated and are largely ad hoc. 
As noted earlier, South Africa’s relationship and historical responsibility towards the region is 
central in this discourse, in particular the need for a peaceful, secure and stable Africa as a 
prerequisite for its development and prosperity. Most of South African civil society’s 
engagements have been in this area rather than in the more traditional socioeconomic 
development fields of international NGOs such as Oxfam, Save the Children, etc., or in the 
health and educational fields such as the philanthropy of the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation. This next section will focus on the role of civil society in South Africa’s peace-
building efforts – as an important part of its South-South cooperation. 
4.1 Civilian capacity and engagement in South-South peace-
building 
Kevin Philips Clements (2009, cited in Shillinger 2009) notes that the work of civil society 
organisations (CSOs) in conflict zones can be categorised as follows: 
● supplying emergency relief and humanitarian assistance 
● working on medium- to long-term economic and social development issues 
● focusing on social justice, human rights advocacy and monitoring 
● focusing on non-violent resolution of conflict and long-term peace-building. 
South African CSOs (such as Gift of the Givers),32 thinktanks and academia have been 
involved in all four areas across the continent, given the prominence of conflict in Africa over 
the past 20 years – despite significant positive steps towards greater stability and peace in 
the region. Because of the centrality of this theme in the South African government’s regional 
engagement, it is not surprising that CSOs, and particularly organisations in this group that 
have a peace and security, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction focus (such as 
the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), the African Centre for the Constructive 
Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), and the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in 
Africa (EISA)), have been at the forefront of South Africa’s development cooperation 
engagement. In 2010, the United Nations Secretary General appointed a senior advisory 
group to conduct an independent review of how civilian capacity (CIVCAP)33 is provided in 
conflict settings – focusing specifically on the role of Southern providers (Keating and 
Wiharta 2013). The rationale for this approach was the realisation that harnessing civilian 
expertise has an important role that is complementary to government efforts. The UN has 
undertaken extensive outreach initiatives to raise awareness about the CIVCAP agenda, 
including holding regional meetings in Indonesia (March 2012), South Africa (July 2012)34 
and Morocco (September 2012). The review covered the activities of Brazil, China, India, 
                                               
32 Kindly note Poskitt (2014) for an overview of the organisation. 
33 According to the CIVCAP research network, civilian capacity refers to non-uniformed individuals or groups deployed overseas 
to crisis or post-conflict settings by (or coordinated through) their respective governments. The term includes personnel 
deployed through bilateral cooperation programmes as well as those deployed through the UN, regional organisations or other 
intergovernmental organisations. It also includes civilian capacity deployed from the public or private sectors, including 
academia and CSOs, which is in some way ‘coordinated’ under government auspices. 
34 South Africa hosted the African regional conference in Pretoria on 19-20 July 2012 and has positioned itself as an advocate in 
the region for CIVCAP. 
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Indonesia, Russia, South Africa and Turkey – noting that more than 80 per cent of CIVCAP 
positions requested by governments were filled by representatives from the global South. 
A CIVCAP research network was established in 2012 to look more closely at the civilian 
capacity of rising powers to participate in their peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction 
activities. The South African civil society representative on the network was ACCORD, a 
CSO specialising in conflict management, conflict analysis and conflict prevention.35 From a 
comparative perspective across the countries that were part of the CIVCAP study, it is 
important to note that overall, civilian deployments have occurred mostly under bilateral 
technical assistance agreements and on the whole have been small, short term and ad hoc. 
Despite South Africa’s extensive peace-building role in the region, it was no exception to this 
finding. 
South Africa, like most of the other countries that were part of this CIVCAP network review, 
has not required or developed a centralised coordinating structure to respond to demands for 
civilian capacity in its peace-building efforts. This made it very difficult to track the actual 
number of South African deployments, maintain a comprehensive database of civilian 
participants or learn from their technical assistance experiences. An analysis of the 
personnel deployed in UN field missions in August 2012 is a useful proxy indicator, showing 
that 63 South African civilians were deployed as opposed to 71 police members and 2,041 
military personnel. A comparison with the other BRICS members shows that only India and 
Russia deployed more civilian personnel, despite the small population size of South Africa 
compared to the other states. 
Table 4.1 Personnel deployed in UN field missions, by category, as of 31 
August 2012 
Country Military Police Civilians Population  
Brazil 2,191 24 34 199m 
Russia 72 21 94 144m 
India 7,066 1,038 232 1.24bn 
China 1,834 83 20 1.35bn 
South Africa 2,041 71 63 51m 
Source: Adapted from Keating and Wiharta (2013) and World Bank Indicators. 
However, it is clear that South Africa prioritises the need to tap into civilian capacity to 
enhance the efficacy of its regional interventions. It is the only partner country in the focus 
group of emerging countries that is developing a policy on civilian participation in peace 
operations. The policy development process is being led by the National Office for the 
Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM) located within DIRCO. The policy aims to define 
the deployment modalities of civilians in South Africa’s bilateral, trilateral and multilateral 
arrangements. Nevertheless, none of the countries that were part of the study has yet 
developed specific policies focused on working in crisis settings per se; rather the focus (also 
for South Africa) seems to be on using their national experience to support partners in the 
later stages of post-conflict reconstruction. In the main, their activities are focused on 
supporting the long-term development transition of these countries. 
The CIVCAP report notes that for South Africa, CIVCAP is part and parcel of a bilateral 
technical assistance approach couched in South-South cooperation (but contextualised in a 
broader UN peace-building paradigm). However, it is also an important soft-power tool that 
helps to enhance the country’s reputation as a major regional actor responding to regional 
needs – and that enables it to leverage this profile and engagement on a global policy level 
                                               
35 It mainly intervenes through mediation, negotiation, training, research and conflict analysis. 
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in an increasingly multipolar world. Importantly, the report noted that there is no ‘single’ 
global South position on the CIVCAP agenda, which concurs with the various interpretations 
within the global South of South-South cooperation. Rather, for South Africa, regional 
considerations weigh in as significantly as global ones. 
In South Africa, like other countries that are part of the CIVCAP study, the researchers noted 
an increase in demand for these types of services, particularly in the priority areas of basic 
safety and security, justice, inclusive political processes, core government functionality and 
economic revitalisation. Importantly, the report noted that capacities which civilians can offer 
are increasingly valuable on the global stage and are drawn from successful domestic 
experiences, policies and procedures. The types of CIVCAP activities are wider than 
deploying technical experts abroad. They also include short-term missions, observer 
missions, training, scholarships and study tours. 
The South African section of the report noted that South Africa has been actively engaged in 
at least two areas in developing the civilian component of regional peacekeeping forces, 
namely for the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Standby Arrangement 
and the African Standby Force (ASF). However, this has mainly focused on policy 
development, participation in training, and contributing civilian personnel to peacekeeping 
exercises; it has not included actual deployment. In addition, South Africa has provided 
civilian capacities for observer and electoral support missions, mediation and policing 
support, democracy promotion, and anti-corruption and truth and reconciliation processes. 
These draw from South Africa’s own rich experiences in this regard. While South Africa has 
considerable capacity both within and outside government on human rights, rule of law, 
transitional justice, and advocacy and legal expertise, there was a clear note of caution that 
South Africa’s CIVCAP reserves are limited and the skills are in high demand domestically as 
well. More specifically, the authors of the CIVCAP report note that it would be a key 
challenge for the newly established SADPA to reach out to this wealth of expertise in 
government, civil society and the private sector without a significant coordination effort. 
Nonetheless, CIVCAP is seen as playing an important supportive role in complementing 
South Africa’s bilateral assistance programme under the ARF and – in the future – potentially 
under the auspices of SADPA. The authors also noted the important role that the epistemic 
community is playing in advancing these concepts into domestic policy agendas. This is also 
reflected in the strength and number of security-focused CSOs in South Africa.36 
4.2 The media and the development debate in South Africa37 
A useful reference point for an analysis of how the South African media has covered the 
international development debate is a print and online media content analysis study 
conducted by Yanacopulos (2013) between 2009 and 2011, complemented by interviews 
with a range of policy stakeholders, civil society representatives and journalists under the 
broader rubric of a project titled ‘Public Perceptions of Development Cooperation of non-DAC 
donors’. She was responsible for the South African case study. 
Yanacopulos (2013: 205), like Czaplińska (2007), argues that there is value to understanding 
the ‘public support’ for international development initiatives as reflected in the public 
discourse about them, given that ‘conventional wisdom suggests that successful and 
sustainable development cooperation policies and expenditure require a constituency for aid 
                                               
36 Apart from ACCORD, there are others such as the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) with a continent-wide reach, the 
Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), SAIIA, the Institute for Global Dialogue, the Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation (CSVR), EISA, and the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) in addition to the range of university-based and 
government thinktanks and academics. 
37 This section draws heavily on an analysis conducted by Rebecca Ramsamy, a visiting SAIIA-KAS Masters scholar during 
2013. 
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in donor countries’ (Czaplińska 2007, cited in Yanacopulos 2013: 205).38 She also notes that 
South Africa, as a ‘new’ or emerging middle power, is, in the first instance, a regional power. 
This suggests a particular relationship with its region, implying: the provision of normative 
leadership related to regional values, principles, processes and institution-building; the 
delivery of regional public goods; and lastly, political and economic dominance in its 
engagement with the region. Schoeman (2000) and others (Van der Westhuizen 1998; 
Flemes and Habib 2009) suggest further that because of the moral standing of emerging 
middle powers in their regions, they also strive for a more active role in international affairs. 
But significantly, Yanacopulos (2013: 206) notes that ‘emerging middle powers are frequently 
developing countries themselves, and have internal demands that differ from established 
middle power countries’. This creates a particular tension between their domestic and 
international policies. 
Yanacopulos (2013) found that the domestic public discourse about international 
development cooperation was nearly non-existent in her media analysis. This was clearly at 
odds with the domestic focus in South Africa on development captured within the South 
African discourse of a ‘developmental state’ and South Africa’s obvious and increasing 
involvement in the region in ‘development activities’, as well as its rising prominence as part 
of the BRICS grouping. Indeed, compared to the other four countries that formed part of the 
project – China, Russia, Poland and India – international development was least discussed 
domestically in the South African case. This absence of a domestic discourse about South 
Africa’s development cooperation activities is explained in the words of Noel and Thérien 
(2002: 632) as follows: 
… the association between public support for redistribution at home and abroad is 
strong and significant, but negative. In countries where domestic income 
redistribution is seen as an important priority, foreign aid is less popular; where this is 
less so, there is more concern for the fate of the poor in the South. 
The findings of SAIIA’s review of the South African media over the period 1996 to 2013 
mostly correspond with this assessment.39 The terms ‘global development policy’ and 
‘international development cooperation’ were largely absent in the South African media 
analysis. By linking the search terms ‘donor aid’ and South Africa, a variety of articles 
appeared that discussed international donor assistance to Africa and South Africa, mainly 
from the European Union (EU), US, Germany, Japan, France and the Scandinavian 
countries (Fraser 1997). The initial coverage praised the commitment of the North to poverty 
alleviation in South Africa, while many of the articles also recognised the important 
contribution of donors to combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic in South Africa (Inggs 2000; The 
Star 1995). 
However, increasingly, commentary focused in the pre-millennium period (1998 and 1999) 
on the failure of aid and the reneging by Northern donors of their aid commitments to the 
developing world (Bowley 1997; Cape Argus 1997). This commentary both preceded and 
informed the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
as well as the establishment of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. It is worth 
noting both pre- and in the post-9/11 period that a great deal of anxiety followed in the South 
African NGO sector as donors started redirecting funds towards other priorities (Baker 1998; 
Hooper-Box 2001). An important side-narrative started around 1999 with a review by the 
South African government of its relationship with particular donors, especially its relationship 
                                               
38 She cites various studies that explore attitudes to development such as DFID’s annual surveys of attitudes towards 
development, Voluntary Service Overseas Study ‘The Live Aid Legacy’ and the ‘Make Poverty History Campaign’, including the 
EU Commission’s ‘The MDGs and Perceptions of Development Aid’ study of European perceptions. 
39 A total of 350 articles from 2003 to 2013 were used to develop this analysis, drawn largely from the SA Media/Sabinet search 
engine accessed through the Wits electronic research database. Special emphasis was given to The Star newspaper, which 
has a dedicated reporter, Peter Fabricius, who covers South African and African foreign policy matters on a regular basis. 
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with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) following a US 
Congress report that accused ‘USAID officials of extreme and unqualified meddling in South 
Africa’s policymaking’ (The Star 1998). This view began to be articulated as donor 
interference in the South African policy space (Hooper-Box 2001; Maleka 2003; Fabricius 
2003, 2007). This was most strongly evident in criticism expressed by President Mbeki in 
2005 towards the South African NGO sector, accusing them of carrying out foreign donor 
agendas (Hughes 2005; Fabricius 2005). This view is still prevalent in some government 
circles, as noted earlier in this report, that donors have undue influence in the affairs of 
Africa, encumbering Africa’s policy space for independent decision-making and action. 
However, as aid continued to be diverted away from key African priorities and countries in 
2001, despite the outcomes of the Monterrey consensus (Stoddard 2004; Stremlau 2005; 
SAPA-AP 2006), voices also emerged suggesting that unlimited aid is not necessarily 
beneficial to either party (Fabricius 2001; Mbeki 2005). More specifically, with reference to 
continued donor support to South Africa, an interesting shift is noted from 2004 onwards, ten 
years after the democratic transition in South Africa, that South Africa’s exit from donor 
support would be apt (Fabricius 2003, 2004). This sentiment is echoed in South African 
media reports following the UK International Development Minister Justine Greening’s 
announcement in May 2013 that the UK would be phasing out its assistance to South Africa, 
as ‘South Africa is now in a position to fund its own development’ (Fabricius 2013). This 
statement led to a sharp rebuff from the South African government. It is, in this context, 
interesting that some analysts viewed the announcement of a South African Development 
Partnership Agency in 2011 as a potential threat to continued donor assistance to South 
Africa (Langeni 2011a, 2011b). 
As Yanacopulos (2013) notes, coverage of South African ‘donor activities’ in the region is 
almost entirely absent in the South African media.40 However, as noted above, the discourse 
around ‘development’ and foreign aid in South Africa’s newspapers has been vibrant and 
covered several themes and perspectives. In order to arrive at a more useful approach to 
assessing the media discourse on South Africa’s partnership with the region, alternative 
search terms were employed in the analysis. Terms that are more appropriate to the South 
African context reflecting instruments through which South Africa channels its assistance to 
the region, as well as the key theatres through which South Africa articulates its vision for 
Africa’s development and prosperity, included words such as the ‘African Development 
Bank’, ‘Development Bank of Southern Africa’, ‘BRICS’, the ‘G8 and G20 Summits’, ‘MDGs’, 
‘African Renaissance Fund’ and ‘NEPAD’. On the whole these terms provided a richer and 
not uncritical tapestry of the variety of South Africa’s ‘development activities’ in the region. 
‘NEPAD’ featured especially prominently. 
However, more significantly, the use of terms such as ‘peacekeeping and South Africa’, 
‘conflict resolution and South Africa’, ‘conflict mediation and South Africa’ and interestingly 
‘development partnership’ most fully represented South Africa’s various engagements with 
the region. This analysis of South Africa’s ‘development’ contribution towards the region sits 
awkwardly with that of the traditional definitions of official development assistance (ODA) and 
underscores again the difficulty of framing South Africa’s development interventions in a 
Northern-donor framework. 
                                               
40 The big exception is South Africa’s complicated relationship with Zimbabwe, which resonated significantly domestically. In this 
case, media coverage closely followed the various calls for support from the Mugabe government to the South African 
government and the corresponding insistence by the South African government on good governance and financial 
accountability. Note: ‘Zim recovery depends on free and fair election’, The Sunday Independent, 25 November 2001; Hills C, 
‘SA has responsibility to Zimbabwe’, The Star, 29 July 2005; Wales M, ‘South Africa must put its foot down if it foots the bill’, 
The Sunday Independent, 8 March 2009; Peta B, ‘No automatic bailout for Zimbabwe’, The Sunday Independent, 22 March 
2009, and Banya N, ‘Zimbabwe seeks R3.25bn in SA loans’, The Star, 9 September 2010. 
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In conclusion, Yanacopulos (2013) notes that the first official announcement by President 
Zuma in his 2009 State of the Nation address of the creation of SADPA elicited a perfunctory 
mention in a News24 article with no additional media coverage. Some additional local 
coverage followed in 2011 after the announcement by DIRCO that the agency would be 
established. However, as noted above, the local media coverage that it elicited suggested 
that the establishment of SADPA might lead to a loss of donor support to South Africa. In 
contrast, her analysis of the international press coverage of SADPA from mid-2010 to mid-
2011 noted extensive treatment of the topic. SADPA was described in these articles as an 
effort to coordinate and integrate South Africa’s various international development activities, 
while the view was also expressed that South Africa is a significant international 
development player. Her perspective is that the government’s public diplomacy efforts on 
SADPA specifically targeted international audiences, ‘arguably making SADPA’s existence 
more relevant to South Africa’s international audiences rather than its domestic one’ (ibid.: 
212). 
Yanacopulos believes that this is typical of an emerging middle power. The South African 
government is representing and utilising SADPA as a vehicle through which development 
assistance ought to be channelled to enhance South Africa’s international status and national 
interest, while carefully balancing internal concerns about the need to tackle poverty and 
development within South Africa. Couched thus mainly as a foreign policy instrument, it is not 
surprising that public discourse has been fairly limited. More importantly, until SADPA has 
been operationalised, public discourse will remain limited. 
But it is worth asking whether a more nuanced perspective would have resulted in the South 
African case if the researcher had adopted an approach that was more sensitive to South 
Africa’s positioning as a proponent of South-South cooperation in its engagement in Africa, 
and more focused on its peace-building role? In addition, the timeframe of the study by 
Yanacopulos (ending in 2011 excluded the hosting of the BRICS Summit in South Africa) is 
also important for the final outcome of the findings.41 
4.2.1 Public opinion and South Africa’s status as a development partner 
A broad-based public opinion survey conducted by the University of Stellenbosch with the 
assistance of the independent survey company Ipsos Markinor provides useful insights into 
the views of ordinary South Africans on a range of foreign policy issues (Van der Westhuizen 
and Smith 2013). One of the findings indicated that while South African society is not 
uncritical of South Africa’s peace-building efforts in the region, South Africans generally 
support the South African government’s efforts to stabilise the region. 
Of a representative sample of 3,500 South Africans surveyed during October and November 
2012,42 66 per cent wanted ‘South Africa to be known as a country that helps to resolve 
conflicts in Africa’ (with 22 per cent strongly agreeing and 44 per cent agreeing). The 
researchers noted that support for this view was regardless of age, race, religion, income, 
geography or level of education. However, when probed about how important these issues 
were to them directly, only 5 per cent of the sample group indicated that ‘conflict in Africa’ 
and a further 4 per cent indicated that ‘global inequality’ is of most concern to them. Another 
4 per cent of the sample group indicated that climate change is an important issue to them. 
In contrast, unemployment (34 per cent), housing (16 per cent), crime (16 per cent), 
                                               
41 The timeframe of the Yanacopulos (2013) analysis might also have affected the findings. SADPA has recently (especially in 
the latter half of 2013) attracted a great deal more public interest. This has mainly been the result of the increase in public policy 
research on the topic by thinktanks and academic institutions such as SAIIA, the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) and the ISS. 
42 The survey was funded by the Open Society Foundation of South Africa and jointly conducted by the University of 
Stellenbosch and the survey company Ipsos Markinor in October and November 2012. A representative sample of 3,500 South 
Africans aged 15 years and older participated in the survey – with each interview lasting around 57 minutes. The sample was 
stratified for race, geography, community size, age, religion, language, education, employment status and living standard 
measurement. Two thousand of the sample group came from urban areas, while 1,500 came from rural areas. 
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education (14 per cent) and illegal immigrants (7 per cent) topped the list of key concerns to 
South Africans. 
Therefore, the survey also found, not surprisingly, that all the respondents were in agreement 
that the promotion of economic growth should be the top priority (at 44 per cent) of South 
Africa’s foreign policy. This should be understood against the backdrop of the level of 
unemployment, poverty and slow economic growth in South Africa. However, when given a 
choice of specific foreign policy options, South Africans also supported the government’s role 
in promoting a world with a more equal distribution of wealth and power (24 per cent of the 
sample group). Sixteen per cent of the sample group believed that the promotion of human 
rights should be the key driver of South Africa’s foreign policy, while a further 16 per cent 
believed that attracting foreign investment should be its key purpose. 
Table 4.2 University of Stellenbosch/Ipsos foreign policy survey, 2012 
Question: In its relations with other countries, South Africa’s main goal should be to? 
Goal Result (%) 
Promote economic growth in South Africa 44 
Promote a more equal distribution of power and wealth in the world 24 
Promote human rights 16 
Attract foreign investment 16 
Source: Adapted from Van der Westhuizen and Smith (2013).  
The researchers also probed the willingness of South African society to provide donor 
support – particularly to Africa. The researchers noted that: 
Interestingly, despite the public’s overwhelming concern with unemployment and 
poverty, 63 per cent of respondents contend that South Africa should give aid to other 
African countries (with 21 per cent strongly agreeing and 42 per cent agreeing). 
Support for South Africa’s role as a donor country shows no significant difference 
across income levels, but there were some racial divergences (with black, coloured, 
Indian and white South Africans agreeing or strongly agreeing at 66, 60, 65 and 50 
per cent respectively). In addition, those with full-time employment are slightly less 
inclined to give aid to Africa (at 54 per cent), while the unemployed show stronger 
support (at 63 per cent). 
(Van der Westhuizen and Smith 2013: 7) 
 
This last finding is particularly interesting as there is a strong assumption in the literature, as 
noted earlier in this section, that South Africans are not supportive of South Africa’s 
development assistance, given the huge developmental needs domestically. 
Of key interest is whose developmental model South Africa should follow. It is clear that 
China’s remarkable economic progress has not gone unnoticed by South Africans. The 
results shown in Table 4.3 are illuminating: 
Table 4.3 University of Stellenbosch/Ipsos foreign policy survey, 2012 
Question: From which of the following countries could we learn most about alleviating poverty 
and unemployment? 
Country Result (%) 
China 26 
Brazil 20 
Botswana 20 
Cuba 11 
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Sweden 9 
India 8 
South Korea 6 
Source: Adapted from Van der Westhuizen and Smith (2013). 
These findings represent a fascinating spectrum of views. On the one hand, the choice of 
China and South Korea as representing both the most and least attractive models of 
development raises interesting implications for South Africa’s ‘developmental state’ model, 
with South Korea (at least politically) much closer to the South African case. The researchers 
noted that at the next level of choice between Brazil and Botswana, younger South Africans 
supported the Brazilian model, while those over 45 opted for the Botswana model. Cuba 
(state-run) and Sweden (social democratic) – both of which provided a great deal of support 
during the anti-apartheid struggle – received much less support, although the somewhat 
higher support for Cuba could be a result of the prominent role that Cuban medical doctors 
are playing – especially in South African rural areas. 
These results are also useful to consider against the backdrop of whom South Africa should 
be aligning itself with geopolitically. While China emerged across the sample group as a key 
ally, it is interesting to note that Xhosa speakers were more pro-China (41 per cent) than 
Zulu speakers (19 per cent), compared to white South Africans (27 per cent). The research 
also found that the poorest and least educated group in the sample identified the United 
States as South Africa’s most important ally. The results also point to the fact that there is a 
growing awareness or possible constituency for emerging powers in South Africa. However, 
this does not necessarily translate into support for the BRICS as an entity, as Russia seems 
to be absent from the analysis.43 
Table 4.4 University of Stellenbosch/Ipsos foreign policy survey, 2012 
Question: With which countries or groups of countries in the following list should South Africa 
be seen to be an ally or close friend? 
Ranked first Result (%) Ranked second Result (%) 
China 26 Europe 19 
US 19 Brazil and India 19 
Europe 15 US 15 
Our neighbours in Southern Africa 13 Our neighbours in Southern Africa 13 
Brazil and India 11 China 13 
Nigeria 9 The rest of Africa excluding Nigeria 12 
The rest of Africa excluding Nigeria 7 Nigeria 9 
Source: Adapted from Van der Westhuizen and Smith (2013). 
There is an interesting dichotomy to be noted here in terms of the ranking of Africa in the 
overall perceptions of South Africans. The researchers pointed out that while South Africans 
believed that they have a leadership role to play in Africa, the rest of the region does not 
feature highly in their estimation as allies of the country. This perception requires further 
probing and analysis, given the findings that South Africa’s leadership role in Africa, South 
Africa’s African Agenda (the primacy of the AU over the UN institutions), and recognition that 
South Africa’s growth and development is closely tied to that of its neighbouring countries 
met with 65 per cent, 58 per cent and 59 per cent support respectively. 
Given the notion that foreign policy is an elite and intellectual preserve, it is also useful to ask 
whether South Africans believe they should have a voice in the direction of the country’s 
                                               
43 This could, of course, also be a function of the choices that the respondents were confronted with. 
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foreign affairs and who else the government should listen to when making foreign policy 
choices. 
The findings once again underline the fact that South Africans believe there are multiple roles 
to be played in South Africa’s foreign policy formation. The prominence of Parliament as a 
platform for public debate is important, but so is the prominence attributed to business over 
the role of trade unions. The researchers interpreted this as an indication of the desperate 
need in South Africa for economic growth and job creation. There is a strong correlation here 
with an expert survey that SAIIA (2014) conducted among foreign policy practitioners in 
South Africa and in the region on the importance of South Africa’s business community in its 
regional engagement. Several African respondents noted that South Africa’s profile and 
credibility to speak with authority on Africa’s developmental concerns and initiatives are 
derived directly from the strength of its economy, but also the prominent economic role that 
South African businesses are playing in the region. 
Table 4.5 University of Stellenbosch/Ipsos foreign policy survey, 2012 
Question: In the formulation of our foreign policy, who should the government listen to? 
First mention Result (%) Second mention Result (%) 
Ordinary citizens 34 Business 27 
Academics and researchers 26 Ordinary citizens 25 
Parliament 15 Parliament 21 
Business 15 Academics and researchers 13 
The South African media 7 The South African media 9 
Trade unions 3 Trade unions 5 
Source: Adapted from Van der Westhuizen and Smith (2013). 
Finally, as a proxy for South Africa’s positioning as a Southern power and support for the 
South-South principle of non-interference, 53 per cent of the respondents agreed (with 32 
per cent agreeing and 21 per cent strongly agreeing) with the statement ‘If an African 
government violates the human rights of its citizens, other African governments should not 
openly criticise that government’. The researchers interpreted this statement as ‘suggestive 
that the South African government’s quiet diplomacy response to human rights violations in 
Zimbabwe, for example, was perhaps not entirely unsupported by ordinary South Africans’.44 
Van der Westhuizen and Smith (2013: 12–13) suggest from the findings that South Africans 
are pragmatic internationalists who are committed to improving the world as long as it also 
means that this will spill over into improving the quality of life for all at home. In this light, 
South Africans seem generally supportive of South Africa’s ‘diplomatic activism’ in the mode 
of a typical middle power with its focus on conflict resolution in its immediate region and 
further afield, the strengthening of the multilateral system, and international law to further its 
interests. Lastly, the survey also found an ‘ambiguous orientation towards both China and 
“the West” [which] may also be symptomatic of a middle power orientation that appreciates 
the strategic value of not being explicitly aligned with any specific power bloc in international 
politics’. 
                                               
44 The findings did not reflect a significant difference between those with no schooling and those with a university degree, 
between the unemployed and full-time employed, or across income levels. However, a generational gap was identified, with 
those in the 65+ group disagreeing most strongly. Some racial divergence was also evident, with black South Africans agreeing 
or strongly agreeing most (at 56 per cent), followed by Indian (at 50 per cent), coloured (at 41 per cent) and white (at 38 per 
cent) South Africans. 
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4.3 The South African private sector and development 
4.3.1 South-South cooperation and the private sector 
South-South investment is regarded as an area of enhanced collaboration among developing 
countries and is considered an important driver of economic growth and development in 
developing countries.45 As noted by the World Investment Report (WIR) (United Nations 
2006: 120): 
The relative importance of South-South FDI [foreign direct investment] in developing 
host countries is confirmed by micro-level data. While TNCs [transnational 
corporations] from developing or transition economies were responsible for 15% of all 
greenfield expansion FDI projects in the world during the period 2002-2005, their 
share was considerably higher in developing and transition economies, and 
especially high in West Asia (33%) and Africa (29%). 
In South Africa, as noted below, the government has granted special treatment to South 
African FDI going into the southern Africa region and has encouraged South Africa’s state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) to invest in regional infrastructure development.46 Until limits on 
outward FDI were eventually abolished in October 2004, the South African government 
adopted a preferential approach towards FDI into the region. This approach has supported 
South Africa’s investment into the region. Table 4.6 gives a breakdown of South Africa’s 
approach towards the liberalisation of outward FDI. 
Table 4.6 South Africa’s liberalisation of its outward FDI regime  
Year Change in policy 
Pre-1996 Firms were permitted to invest only in Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland 
1997 Investments of up to ZAR50m were allowed in SADC countries and up to ZAR30m 
elsewhere 
1998 Limits increased to ZAR250m in SADC and ZAR50m elsewhere, although for 
approved projects ZAR55m could be invested 
1999 Limits increased to ZAR750m in SADC and ZAR500m in other African countries 
2002 Limits increased to ZAR2bn in Africa and ZAR1bn elsewhere 
Early 2004 Limits increased to ZAR2bn for each new and approved investment into Africa and 
ZAR500m for investments outside Africa. Consideration was to be given to requests 
by firms to utilise their local cash holdings to finance up to 20% of the excess costs 
of the new investment if the overall cost of the investment exceeded the respective 
limits. The remainder was to be financed through foreign borrowing, the terms of 
which had to be disclosed to the South African Reserve Bank. 
October 2004 Limits on outward FDI were abolished. 
Note: After October 2004 firms are required to obtain Reserve Bank approval for outward FDI. The Bank reserves the right to 
intervene in capital outflows for very large investments in order to manage the potential adverse effects on the foreign exchange 
market or the impact on the country’s balance of payments. 
Source: Adapted from United Nations (2006).  
Given South Africa’s status as Africa’s biggest economy, it is no surprise that the South 
African private sector is actively engaged in the rest of Africa. In fact, South Africa was a 
leading provider of FDI from developing countries as early as 1970. The country has 
emerged as the biggest African investor in Africa, and for a while occupied the status as the 
                                               
45 This call was made at the Second Summit of the Group of 77 held in Doha, Qatar, in June 2005 (United Nations 2006: 217). 
46 In the case of the latter, this has occurred mainly with support from the DBSA and the IDC, which has provided the equity, 
export and infrastructure finance support. Much of the SOE engagement in the region has been in support of the NEPAD 
process with some of the investments including Eskom’s (energy parastatal) investments in projects in Angola, Botswana, DRC, 
Lesotho, Namibia and Tanzania. PetroSA (South Africa’s national oil company) has interests in Algeria, Gabon and Nigeria. 
Transnet (transport parastatal) has invested in Madagascar, Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique. United Nations (2006:207) 
and SAIIA’s own research. 
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biggest overall investor in the continent outside its gas, oil and mining complex. As noted by 
the WIR (United Nations 2006: 239): 
The scope for ‘South-South’ FDI has led many developing host countries to adopt 
specific strategies to attract such investment. In a 2006 UNCTAD survey of IPAs 
[Investment Promotion Agencies], more than 90% of all African respondents stated 
that they currently targeted FDI from other developing countries, notably from within 
their own region. Indeed, for African IPAs, South Africa tops the list of developing 
home countries targeted… 
The same report noted that South Africa accounted for more than 50 per cent of all FDI 
inflows into Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland. SAIIA’s research found that 
South Africa was also the top investor in countries such as Mozambique and Tanzania. It is 
important to note that South African investment in the region is primarily led by the private 
sector (despite the significant engagement of South African SOEs in infrastructure 
development). In fact, today South African companies are key players in the financial, 
insurance, health, legal, property, agriculture, mining, manufacturing, telecommunications, 
construction, retail, tourism, entertainment and advertising sectors in economies across 
Africa. South Africa’s economic weight and interconnectedness with the region is illustrated 
by a 2004 study which found that a one-percentage point slowdown in the South African 
growth rate leads to a half to three-quarter percentage point slowdown in the rest of sub-
Saharan Africa (Arora and Vamvadikis 2004). Nonetheless, this status has recently begun to 
change with the emergence of China, India and Brazil and other rising economies as 
significant investors in the rest of the region. 
4.3.2 South African FDI and the region 
The South African Reserve Bank estimates that South African investment in the rest of the 
region grew from about US$1.2bn in 1996 to just over US$4bn by 2001 in real terms. 
Although this represented average annual growth of at least 32 per cent in the period 1996–
2001, it still represented only 3 per cent of total South African FDI at the time. By 2002, the 
2004 World Investment Report estimated that South Africa’s FDI stock in the rest of Africa 
accounted for 7 per cent of its total outward FDI. By 2011, South Africa’s FDI stock in Africa 
had increased to US$18bn, representing 22 per cent of its outward FDI stock and exceeding 
China’s FDI stock in Africa of US$16bn (United Nations 2011). It made South Africa the fifth 
largest holder of FDI stock in Africa in 2011 and the second largest developing country 
investor in Africa after Malaysia.47 The majority of South Africa’s outward stock can be 
attributed to reinvested earnings in the private non-banking sector and its largest share is in 
Mauritius, which has positioned itself as a regional financial centre. A quarter of South 
Africa’s stock is concentrated in Nigeria, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. 
Not surprisingly, the rapid growth of South African investment into the rest of the region, 
combined with the dominance of South African companies and products in many of Africa’s 
small markets, has also raised questions about the development impact of South African 
investment there. South African investors, like other foreign investors, have found that doing 
business in African countries cannot be divorced from their often contested and sensitive 
political and social environment. However, because of their economic clout in Africa’s small 
markets, South African firms, like other foreign firms, can become important catalysts for 
positive change in the societies where they operate. 
 
 
                                               
47 Malaysia (US$19bn), South Africa (US$18bn), China (US$16bn)and India (US$14bn) are the largest developing-country 
sources of FDI in Africa. 
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As noted by Richard Duffy (2012), Vice President of Continental Africa, AngloGold Ashanti: 
Technology is changing the way business is being done in Africa… There is no longer 
anywhere where communities are cut off from the rest of the world and this raises 
expectations and puts pressure on government and on companies to respond to this 
changing dynamic. So a new model is very important. We see ourselves as a 
catalyst for development, rather than the sole source of opportunity [our 
emphasis]. We want to sit across the table from community leaders and discuss 
relevant issues. 
4.3.3 The role of the private sector in development 
In considering whether South African companies do act as catalysts for development in the 
region, it is useful to explore whether South African companies are acting as responsible 
investors. The UNDP and the International Business Leader Forum report (Davies 2011) 
suggest that there are three ways in which companies can contribute towards the 
achievement of the MDGs, namely through their: 
● social investment and philanthropy 
● public advocacy, policy dialogue and institution-strengthening 
● core business operations and value chains. 
There are numerous examples that illustrate the use by South African companies of all three 
models in their engagement strategies in the rest of the region. For the purpose of this study 
it is useful to look at South African corporate social investment (CSI) spending in the rest of 
the region.48 Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to find reliable figures of South African CSI 
expenditure in the rest of Africa. Nonetheless, it is useful to consider CSI by South African 
corporates in their home market as a potential proxy indicator. Some conclusions can be 
drawn from their behaviour in their own market. 
South African CSI 
The CSI Handbook (Trialogue 2013) found that total corporate social investment expenditure 
in South Africa had grown to ZAR7.8bn in 2013 – translating as growth in real terms of 8 per 
cent over the previous year. This amount is almost equivalent to the total ODA that the South 
African government receives each year.49 Of this total figure, the top 100 companies on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange accounted for 70 per cent of social investment expenditure of 
around ZAR5.4bn. But importantly, around half of total CSI expenditure came from just 31 
companies, mainly in the mining, financial services and retail sectors. 
One of the interesting findings of the research conducted by Trialogue for the 2013 CSI 
Handbook was an exploration of the factors that drove the business rationale for social 
investment. Corporates were asked to identify and rank three drivers out of a total of seven. 
For 84 per cent, the moral imperative to ‘do the right thing’ was one of the top three 
considerations, followed by reputational benefits (60 per cent) and then the Department of 
Trade and Industry’s Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) codes of good 
practice (44 per cent). Strategic reasons came in at 37 per cent, followed by industry sector 
obligations at 28 per cent, licence-to-operate at 20 per cent, and in last place, ‘as a result of 
stakeholder pressures’ at 18 per cent. However, it is notable that those businesses which 
indicated that ‘licence-to-operate’ was the most important reason for their CSI expenditure (6 
per cent of the sample group) also spent the most on social investment – at least three times 
as much as motivated by any other driver. Moral imperative still ranked in second place, 
                                               
48 Note the paper Business from the BRICS: South Africa, N Grobbelaar, SAIIA/IDS (2014, forthcoming) for a further exploration 
of how South African companies contribute towards development through their core business operations, value chains, public 
advocacy, policy dialogue and institution-strengthening. 
49 A further ZAR8bn is provided by ‘high-net-worth-individuals’ (HNWI). Thus domestic CSI is almost double the amount of 
annual ODA to South Africa. 
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followed by B-BBEE codes, stakeholder pressures, strategic reasons, industry sector 
charters, and reputational reasons in last place. This indicates that regulation does matter in 
the corporate social behaviour of companies. 
While 82 per cent of corporate respondents had operations in other countries, only one-third 
(34 per cent) of these companies had CSI programmes outside South Africa. But among 
these were the top CSI performers in South Africa, namely Anglo American, Nedbank, 
SABMiller, Old Mutual, MTN and Vodacom. It is also noteworthy that both the budget and the 
strategy were determined by the local country office for a small group of companies with 
foreign CSI programmes. However, for the large majority (over 40 per cent), the CSI strategy 
was determined at the head office of the company in South Africa. On the whole, their foreign 
CSI expenditure represented around 10 per cent of their total CSI budget. It is important to 
note as well that the researchers found that accountability for CSI sits at executive or board 
level. This ensures that CSI receives prominent attention throughout the organisation. 
Table 4.7 Companies perceived to be achieving the most developmental 
impact, corporate perceptions, 2013  
Rank Company 
1 Anglo American, Nedbank 
2 SABMiller 
3 MTN 
4 SASOL 
5 Vodacom 
6 Barclays Africa, Woolworths 
7 First Rand Group, FNB 
8 Transnet 
9 Discovery, Investec, Old Mutual 
10 Pick ‘n Pay, Standard Bank  
Other mentions (4) Outsurance, BHP Billiton, Shanduka 
Other mentions (3) Eskom, Clover, Tiger Brands, Anglo American Chairman’s Fund, AngloGold 
Ashanti 
Total N=91 (up to 3 responses) 
Source: Adapted from Trialogue (2013): 58 
Table 4.8 Companies perceived to be achieving the most developmental 
impact, non-profit organisation perceptions, 2013 
Rank Company 
1 Anglo American 
2 Nedbank 
3 Old Mutual, Vodacom 
4 Barclays Africa, Pick ‘n Pay 
5 Discovery, FNB 
6 Woolworths 
7 Standard Bank 
8 Investec, SABMiller 
9 FirstRand Group 
10 Telkom  
Other mentions (4) AfriSam, Coca-Cola, MMI, Mutual & Federal, RMB, Sasol, Transnet 
Other mentions (3) Bidvest, BP, Engen, Eskom, HCI, Lewis Group, Liberty, Sanlam, Spar, Toyota 
SA 
Total N=132 (up to 3 responses) 
Source: Adapted from Trialogue (2013): 58  
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There are a number of reasons to believe that South African companies are exporting the 
good corporate behaviour required in their home market into the rest of the region. 
A study conducted by the OECD (Baskin 2005) found that of 127 listed companies from 
emerging markets, South African multinationals were identified as leaders in corporate social 
responsibility. Indeed, the results of the study found that South African companies showed a 
higher awareness and implementation of corporate responsibility activities than those of 
many OECD countries. The study also concluded that one of the key drivers of corporate 
responsibility in the South African case was the ‘home-grown phenomenon’, namely that 
South Africa’s own corporate governance code, as exemplified by King III (2009) and other 
domestic legislation, is providing the framework for engagement by listed South African 
companies abroad. 
This is borne out by a case study which found that the industrial relations of transnational 
corporation (TNC) affiliates are in part shaped by their home country (United Nations 2006). 
So, for example, if unions and collective action are accepted labour practices in a parent 
company’s home territory, then it is likely that such action would also be accepted in their 
affiliates. South Africa has very advanced labour legislation, which includes the Labour 
Relations Act (1995) and its various amendments, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
(1997) and its amendments, the Employment Equity Act (1998) and the Skills Development 
Act (1999). Enforcement of this legislation has shaped both the behaviour and the practices 
of South African TNCs in Africa. 
South Africa’s listed companies, and specifically its blue chip companies, are regarded as 
playing a particularly positive corporate investment role. This is also because of regulation 
introduced by the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). The JSE was a first mover on the 
continent in introducing a socially responsible investment index in July 2004.50 Companies 
that apply to be listed on the index are expected to meet 94 criteria related to economic, 
environmental and social sustainability. They are also regularly reviewed to assess their 
commitment to the criteria. The review also covers their external activities, although the 
criteria are slightly less stringent (United Nations 2006). 
The South African private sector: public advocacy, policy dialogues and institution-
strengthening 
South African companies are active participants in a variety of public–private dialogue fora, 
including the annual World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos (which is also attended by the 
South African government), the annual Africa WEF and industry events such as the Annual 
African Mining Indaba, which is held in Cape Town every year. These fora serve to bring 
various stakeholders together from government, academia and business to discuss policy-
related issues. 
As noted by the WEF, it ‘engages political, business, academic and other leaders of society 
in collaborative efforts to shape global, regional and industry agendas’.51 South African 
companies are represented in the WEF structures as Strategic Partners (Eskom, Old Mutual 
and SABMiller), Industry Partners (African Rainbow Minerals, Eskom, Naspers, Old Mutual, 
Royal Bafokeng Nation, SABMiller, Sasol and Telkom SA) and Global Growth partners 
(Business Connexion, Harith General Partners, J&J Group, Sekunjalo Investments and 
Trans Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA)). At the national level, South African companies are 
active participants in the business chambers of the countries where they have invested, while 
some of the major South African investors are also represented on high-level advisory 
business councils at a national level. 
                                               
50 See www.jse.co.za/Products/SRI.aspx. 
51 See www.weforum.org/world-economic-forum. 
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In terms of global policy frameworks and initiatives, the Global Compact,52 launched in 2000 
by the UN Secretary-General, receives significant support and engagement from South 
African corporates with some of its CEOs having served and serving on its board. As the 
world’s largest voluntary corporate citizenship initiative and derived from universally agreed 
conventions and declarations, its ten principles cover human rights, labour standards, the 
environment and anti-corruption. Many of the more than 12,000 participants and 
stakeholders are in the developing world. Participants are expected to both undertake 
projects in a way that advances the broader development goals of the UN and to internalise 
the principles in their operations. The Global Compact works closely with multiple 
stakeholders interested in the activities of corporates, namely governments, business, civil 
society organisations, labour, and UN agencies. South Africa also has a local chapter of the 
Global Compact. The National Business Initiative (NBI) has acted as the Focal Point of the 
Global Compact Local Network South Africa since 2007 and currently has 84 signatories.53 
The NBI is a voluntary coalition of around 100 companies in South Africa which have 
committed themselves towards shared and sustainable development. Prominent South 
African corporates such as Sasol, Eskom, Barloworld and Deloitte participate actively in the 
activities of the Global Compact as does the University of South Africa (UNISA) Centre for 
Corporate Citizenship. 
One example where the South African government and the corporate sector have worked 
strongly in concert has been in the development of standards of good practice relating to the 
Kimberley Certification Process (KP). The initiative emerged in the 1990s as a result of the 
use of illicit diamond sales to fund the activities of rebel groups in Sierra Leone and Angola. 
Global Witness launched a global advocacy campaign against ‘conflict diamonds’ in the 
wake of a range of atrocities committed against the civilian population by the Revolutionary 
United Front forces in Sierra Leone. This resulted in a ban by the UN Security Council of all 
diamond sales from Sierra Leone in May 2000 until the government had established a 
certification system for the legal export of its diamonds. The diamond industry was also 
encouraged to establish certification measures to ensure that conflict diamonds did not enter 
the market. De Beers and the World Diamond Council in particular were key actors in 
developing a certification process for diamond sales and received significant political support 
from the South African government to see the process through. The KP was adopted on 31 
July 2003 with South Africa as a key signatory. Around 70 other countries now underwrite the 
process. 
At the time, the KP represented a significant public–private initiative that brought together 
government, industry and civil society to halt the sales of conflict diamonds. However, it has 
encountered some difficulties in recent years around the controversial position of 
Zimbabwe’s Marange diamonds. Successive KP plenaries in Jerusalem (June 2010), St 
Petersburg (July 2010), Brussels (January 2011) and Kinshasa (June 2011) have all failed to 
reach a consensus on a modification of the KP definition of conflict diamonds that broadens 
its remit. UN Resolution 55/56 adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 2000 
defined conflict diamonds to be ‘rough diamonds which are used by rebel movements to 
finance their military activities, including attempts to undermine or overthrow legitimate 
Governments’ (Kimberley Process 2003). This is the text that found its way into the KP 
definition. However, NGOs like Global Witness argue that the sale of the Marange diamonds 
should be regarded as conflict diamonds given the controversial role played by the 
Zimbabwe military against its own population. Global Witness withdrew its support from the 
KP in 2011. Unfortunately, very little progress has been made since to strengthen the 
process, also under South Africa’s chairmanship in 2013, leading many to question the 
efficacy and credibility of the KP (Masiya and Benkenstein 2012). 
                                               
52 See www.unglobalcompact.org. 
53 www.nbi.org.za. 
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The willingness of the South African government to engage proactively in the development of 
the KP presents an interesting contrast with its non-engagement with the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). There have been several calls on the South African 
government to join the EITI by both civil society but also countries such as Norway, one of 
the key proponents of the initiative. The government has resisted these calls by pointing out 
that South Africa is recognised as having one of the most transparent budgeting processes 
available worldwide through its medium term budgeting framework. This obviates the need 
for additional reporting given the visibility with which South African revenue is distributed. But 
underlying the South African government’s reluctance to join the mechanism is that it is 
largely the result of a Northern initiative that until recently was only targeting developing 
countries to become signatories. This has changed more recently with some signs that both 
the UK and Australia are considering joining the EITI, which might sway the South African 
government to reconsider its position. The second factor that could possibly change the 
government’s position is the argument that South African corporates, through their 
investments and presence in the rest of the region, are significant shapers of the norms and 
values that frame investment in Africa’s extractive sector. South Africa’s joining of the EITI 
would send a powerful signal to the rest of the region about how it would like to see the 
extractive sector develop. 
However, the EITI also shows very clearly the political sensitivities that the South African 
government takes into consideration when it signs up to internationally agreed principles and 
initiatives that might be utilised in a punitive manner against the South. South Africa is 
extremely hesitant to support any initiative that might have an effect on its own or its region’s 
policy space to pursue a locally-led development path. This is especially the case if this could 
be used against it to prevent access to markets for its goods or, in this case, primary 
products from the extractive sector. 
South African private sector: core business operations and value chains 
On the whole, when considering the private sector’s contribution to the South African 
government’s development partnership with the region, it is important to note that they are 
actors mainly driven by a profit incentive. Nonetheless, they have far surpassed the rather 
pessimistic assessments of some analysts about the willingness of corporate South Africa to 
support the renaissance of Africa. Despite the fact that they do not view themselves as 
development actors, they have a clear vision of the importance of partnership in unlocking 
Africa’s potential. The success and contribution of the South African private sector to Africa’s 
development are also indicative of the value of approaching the same challenge from 
different perspectives and with different tools and modes of engagement – for it is clear that 
South Africa’s corporate sector has played a significant role in changing the prevailing 
discourse of the late 1990s and early 2000s from the ‘hopeless continent’ to one of ‘Africa 
rising’.54 
There is also no doubt that South African corporates have had a significant developmental 
impact in the region, although these are often described as economic rather than 
developmental effects. The most discernible effect is on the nature of Africa’s evolving 
private sector, particularly of its smaller economies. These impacts can be broadly described 
as: formalisation of the job market; increasing efficiencies and productivity; driving down 
costs to consumers through increasing competition; innovation and transfer of technology; 
increasing fiscal stability and sustainability through increasing revenue collection; local 
economic development through upstream and downstream linkages; growing global 
integration and the softer, less tangible effects on the business climate; and local and 
international business confidence (Grobbelaar and Besada 2008). 
 
                                               
54 Both terms were used on the front page of The Economist magazine in 2000 and 2011 respectively. 
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Lastly, it is important to note, as pointed out by James Ahiakpor (1990: xi): 
The main conclusion that I reach from my attempts to integrate both theoretical and 
empirical research is that foreign firms, including multinationals, are better regarded 
as neutral agents in the process of economic growth and development. Whether they 
contribute positively or negatively to the development process depends very much on 
the economic policy climate within which they operate. 
This remark points to the importance of good governance. South African corporates 
recognise the value of good governance linked with stability and peace for the sustainability 
of their operations in the region. In this area they are ad idem with the South African 
government’s perspective that these factors are critically important to the development and 
prosperity of the continent. 
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5 The impact and efficacy of South Africa’s 
peace-building development partnerships – 
a mixed bag and some unresolved issues 
 
As noted above, South Africa has played a key role in supporting peace-building and post-
conflict development in the rest of Africa over the past 20 years as part of its South-South 
cooperation. A study called ‘Enhancing South Africa’s post-conflict development and peace-
building activity in Africa’ conducted by Hendricks and Lucey (Lucey and O’Riordan 2014) on 
behalf of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) reviewed the impact of South Africa’s 
activities in three of the key theatres where South Africa has been active, namely DRC (the 
biggest recipient of South African support – up to ZAR2bn),55 Burundi and South Sudan. The 
types of government-to-government engagements included: 
… the drafting of frameworks and laws; capacity-building, such as the training of 
diplomats and civil servants; information-sharing exchanges and workshops; 
implementation support, for example assistance with electoral materials; 
infrastructure development and economic trade and development activities. 
(Lucey and O’Riordan 2014: 5) 
The research identified several lessons, but also raised several unanswered questions that 
are fundamental to the future approach of South Africa as a development partner in the 
region. On the whole, South Africa’s engagements were regarded positively. South Africa 
was viewed as having comparable experiences to share, given that its development 
trajectory is more similar and appropriate to African experiences than that of Western 
countries. South Africa also enjoyed the trust and confidence of its partners, giving it high-
level buy-in and access where other partners might struggle. South Africa also seems to be 
able to provide these types of services in a much more cost-effective manner than traditional 
donors. The training of diplomats from the region by the South African Diplomatic Academy 
located in DIRCO was regarded as especially useful as it contributed meaningfully to 
equipping African diplomats with technical capacity and knowledge to negotiate and engage 
internationally. Against this background, South Africa has the potential to play a catalytic role 
in the region, becoming ‘the service provider of choice’ to develop ‘capacities in partner 
countries to negotiate and defend Africa-wide interests’. South Africa also enjoyed particular 
strengths in security sector reform and gender mainstreaming, which the researchers 
believed the country should use more effectively. 
On the negative side, a number of issues where raised. These included that South Africa’s 
impact was limited given the ad hoc and short-term nature of its engagements. While 
numerous Memoranda of Understanding were signed, they were not always implemented 
and followed up. Some information exchanges and capacity building and training were once-
off initiatives, lacking context and having a geographic bias towards urban centres. This 
meant that some of the training offered followed a ‘one size fits all model’ that was not 
appropriate for different country settings. On the whole, while South Africa’s engagements 
were demand-driven, they lacked proper integration into national planning frameworks. South 
Africa also seldom engaged civil society, other non-state actors or other donors. 
Lucey and O’Riordan (2014) make a number of suggestions that South Africa should take on 
board in ensuring that its engagement is more effective. These include the adoption of a 
proper knowledge management system that is more strategic, focused on a long-term vision 
                                               
55 DIRCO official, March 2014. 
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and supported by properly structured M&E, learning, project management and financial 
transparency. This finding is also strongly endorsed by others such as Besharati (2013a, 
2013b). The Lucey and O’Riordan study also recommends that South Africa needs to build 
more expertise on post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD), making use of 
experts with experience in this field and with deep knowledge of Africa. A model that mimics 
the DFID network of UK-based research institutions, thinktanks and universities was 
regarded as one way to strengthen internal analytic capability, but also to provide the context 
and analysis that often accompany difficult and intractable politically sensitive governance 
and development challenges. The study also recommends expanding this relationship to 
NGOs and the private sector to strengthen the institutional capacity of SADPA to engage in a 
range of contexts and through diverse methodologies. Lastly, all three authors recommend 
that more attention should focus on understanding the national planning frameworks of 
partnership countries and situating South Africa’s activities within these frameworks. 
Moving into more sensitive terrain, Lucey and O’Riordan (2014) suggest that the 
establishment of SADPA assumes that South Africa will be expanding a diplomatic 
relationship to include a developmental partnership. However, care should be taken about 
how this framing of relations plays out at a practical level. While South Africa might view the 
framing of its engagement as inherently technical or benevolent, there is no doubt that for the 
recipient, the engagement is deeply political. Moreover, while the notion of a ‘development 
partner’ as opposed to a ‘donor’ seems to signal an ‘emphasis on implementation rather than 
on financial clout’, South Africa should choose carefully how it engages. An unequal power 
relationship is implicit even under a watered-down guise of a ‘development partnership’. 
Importantly, the recommendation that South Africa should engage alongside other donors in 
the national aid architectures of countries should be approached with caution. This is a 
serious issue and consideration for South Africa, given the emphasis on trilateral cooperation 
in the SADPA model as a key instrument to enhance its financial clout and leverage. 
Besharati (2013b: 40) rightly asks the question: whose agenda will prevail if other donors 
contribute more than two-thirds of SADPA’s funds? As a way to address this concern, he 
proposes that South Africa’s ‘programming should first be developed, in consultation with 
other African partners, and subsequently donors should be approached to fund 
programmes’. Others note that donor interference in South African programming would be 
less of a problem where South Africa clearly has the competency to lead, such as in the area 
of public financial management (as it is already doing in the case of the Collaborative Africa 
Budget Reform Initiative).56 These competencies are especially important in fragile state 
settings and fundamental in building capable and efficient modern state institutions. 
Following from the above, one of the ways that South Africa could strengthen its 
programming aligned with its competencies is to look very carefully at the principles that will 
guide its development interventions. More importantly, while it is useful to learn from both 
established Northern donors and new Southern providers, South Africa would do well in 
working closely with its partners in the region to strengthen their national planning and 
development frameworks. This could be a powerful instrument to guide South Africa’s 
programming based on the principle of partnership. Ensuring that national planning 
frameworks also complement regional frameworks and that South Africa supports 
engagements at this level as well could be very effective in helping to put the region on a far 
more sustainable footing. 
Lastly, there remains a great deal of uncertainty about the exact mandate of SADPA. The 
proposed size of the organisation, with an initial staff complement of 20 increasing to 50, 
suggests a very modestly sized operation considering that Africa consists of more than 50 
states. This also raises the question of where else SADPA will draw its expertise from and 
the relationship between itself, the DBSA, IDC and other DFIs. Unless it has significant 
                                               
56 The author wishes to thank Richard Carey for the useful inputs related to this particular topic. 
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technical expertise and depth, SADPA can mainly aspire to become a coordinating 
mechanism that tries to bring greater focus and coherence to the range of development 
partnership activities that several of South Africa’s government departments are already 
involved in. 
While South Africa prioritises engagement in conflict theatres on the continent, it is unclear 
whether SAPDA will focus only on these fragile settings. Its current track record suggests 
that this is a priority for South Africa, but it is increasingly moving into other countries as well. 
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6 Conclusion 
6.1 Assessment of the country’s positioning, capacity and 
comparative advantages 
Besharati (2013b) suggests that South Africa enjoys particular comparative advantages. 
These include: 
● Proximity and ‘insider’ status: South Africa’s own unique experiences of 
development and a shared identity and geography with the region enhance its 
capacity to engage with countries in the region. 
● Specialised expertise: While South Africa is not an experienced ‘donor’, it has 
significant strengths and capacities to share with the region. These include a strong 
track record in peace-building, reconciliation and democracy, mainly drawing from its 
own experiences. South Africa also has significant experience in ‘state and institution’ 
building that is complemented by its human resource development and capacity 
building in Africa, mainly through the training of African civil servants. 
● Public financial management: This is a key competency of the South African state, 
with SARS in particular winning international plaudits for the way it manages revenue 
collection, customs management and domestic resource mobilisation. South Africa 
plays a leading role in the Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative (CABRI) and 
in the African Tax Administration Forum. It is also a leading member of the C-10 
(representing the Committee of Ten African Ministers of Finance and Central Bank 
Governors) and in regional capacity building in statistical analyses and information-
gathering. 
● Infrastructure: South Africa is a significant player in the development of the region’s 
infrastructure – both in framing and politically driving key African infrastructure 
projects such as PIDA and through regional initiatives (such as NEPAD and the 
SADC). In addition, the country is providing extensive project financing and financial 
support through the IDC and the DBSA for water, transport, energy and 
telecommunications infrastructure. 
The following additional comparative advantages could be added: 
● Civilian capacity building and a strong epistemic community: South Africa has a 
robust and regionally engaged civil society that is involved in a range of capacity 
building activities across the continent. Drawing on its significant experience in 
constitutional justice, mediation, peace-building, early warning, but also deep 
research expertise on regional integration, trade and investment, and Africa’s 
engagement with the rest of the world, provides a significant platform on which to 
build a fuller South African development partnership offering to the region. 
● Regionally engaged private sector: South Africa’s relative economic strength with 
regard to the region combined with its robust and regionally engaged private sector is 
contributing significantly towards the development of the region. There is much 
potential for the exploration of innovative public–private partnerships in the region. 
● Bridge-builder: This comparative advantage is slightly more amorphous than the 
advantages previously identified. South Africa is an active member, participant and 
engaged observer in a range of global initiatives and fora (such as the WTO, the 
World Bank, the Africa Partnership Forum, the G20, the IMF, the OECD, the UN and 
its various agencies, IBSA and the BRICS). Combined with its active participation and 
leadership in a range of African fora and initiatives (such as the AU, SADC, the AfDB, 
NEPAD, the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), and SACU), this unique positioning 
enables South Africa to both seek to represent African perspectives in these fora, and 
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also attempt to develop a consensus around African interests and concerns. This is a 
difficult role as South Africa has not been nominated or elected to fulfil this role, nor 
do African interests converge in every instance with South African interests. 
Nevertheless, South Africa’s active role in global affairs and in its region provides an 
opportunity to leverage and elevate Africa’s development concerns through multiple 
fora and initiatives. 
6.2 Key priorities 
South Africa has in the past prioritised, and will in the future continue to prioritise, the region 
in its development partnership activities. As noted by Besharati (2013b), its projects have 
consistently focused on: 
● regional integration 
● peace, security and stability 
● post-conflict reconstruction 
● strengthening relations with Africa and the global South 
● promoting good governance 
● humanitarian assistance. 
However, other priorities are also to be discerned: 
● building North-South partnerships through various international fora, including the UN 
and others 
● focus on trilateral cooperation (driven both by necessity and by a need for learning 
from best practice) 
● global governance and the creation of supportive frameworks for Africa’s 
development aspirations, which also translate into equitable sharing of the global 
public goods burden. 
6.3 Final remarks 
South Africa is an engaged development partner in its region and recognised globally for its 
advocacy on behalf of Africa. Nonetheless, a great deal of uncertainty still remains about the 
future contours and the ambitions of SADPA and South Africa’s South-South cooperation. 
Important actors (such as civil society and the private sector) that could enhance South 
Africa’s offering seem to be largely excluded from the framing of South Africa’s aspirations as 
a development or South-South cooperation partner. There is a clear need for more 
consultation with these actors. However, stronger engagement with the eventual 
beneficiaries of South Africa’s development cooperation is also needed as South Africa 
begins to frame both its vision and the technicalities of its ‘programming’. This also implies a 
better understanding of the political and socioeconomic context of South Africa’s activities. 
South Africa’s epistemic community can play an important role in bolstering and 
complementing the South African government’s understanding in this area. Lastly, with 
increasing resources channelled by South Africa towards its partners (with support from 
other trilateral partners), there is a need for greater transparency as well as better M&E 
systems to ensure that funds are spent in an accountable manner and South Africa’s 
contribution is having a real impact. Some lessons could be drawn from the aid effectiveness 
practices of traditional donors, while the IBSA Fund managed by the UNDP’s Special Unit for 
South-South Cooperation also offers a useful departure point for the framing of South 
Africa’s indicators and criteria for support. It is clear that SADPA will require extremely strong 
technical and financial capacities that currently do not reside within DIRCO but are more 
prevalent in the National Treasury. At least in the initial stages of the formation of SADPA 
there is a strong case to be made for close cooperation between these two departments, with 
the option of ongoing secondment of staff from the Treasury and other development finance 
institutions to SADPA. 
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South Africa has an opportunity to professionalise and better coordinate its diverse 
engagements in South-South cooperation and regional partnership, thereby enhancing its 
impact and contributing meaningfully to the elimination of poverty and conflict in its region. 
After all, South Africans recognise that their destiny is closely tied to that of their region. 
Ensuring that the rest of the continent is able to pursue its development aspirations is not 
only a positive outcome for the creation of regional public goods, especially if there is strong 
integration between national development plans and regional initiatives, but ultimately also 
good for South Africa. 
Lastly, South Africa is uniquely positioned as a key representative from the global South that 
has a proven track record in building effective North-South and South-South cooperation. 
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